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PREFACE
A voluminous bibliography of excellent materials de­
voted to the Sioux War of 1876 attests to the fascination 
this subject holds for amateur and professional historians. 
One basis of interest may be a morbid preoccupation in the 
shocking violence that was manifested as standard practice 
by the red man--and sometimes by .'his white adversary* A 
more humane motivation may be found in the sympathy which 
many students express on behalf of the underdog, the Indian. 
Other researchers associate themselves, in their imagi­
nation, with the hardy folk who forged a civilization in the 
savage West,
The object of this work, is to present the role 
Brigadier General George Crook fulfilled during the most 
■extensive Indian war west of the Mississippi River, In. 
conformance with the precepts of modern historiography, this 
objective will be approached in the following phases: a 
study of background events and causitiye factors; review 
and analysis of General Crook1 s carnualgna durine the con-
v  -  W  ■
fllct; and, his contribution, to immediate results of the 
conflict.,
Reference must be made to the works compiled.by con­
temporary participants of the Sioux War of 1876. These
iii
materials have been invaluable in determining chronology 
and color. War Path and Bivouac, by John F. Finerty, the 
doughty correspondent of the Chicago Times, has been 
helpful in specifying the dates of marches and camp 
locations# Accounts written by the soldier-authors,
Captain Anson Mills, Lieutenants John G* Bourke, Charles 
Xing, and James H. Bradley have been utilized to gain an 
understanding of military action#
This literature generally affects the romantic 
style typical of the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
and often betrays the authors’ partiality to their re­
spective commanders, Their accounts tend to be highly 
localized and a sound perspective of the complete action in 
a large campaign is usually lacking# This deficiency stems 
from the limited field of vision of the contemporary 
soldier-author, who did not enjoy the blessings of unre­
stricted access to all correspondence, particularly that of 
high-ranking officials# Regardless of these limitations, 
their works are a valuable contribution to latter day under­
standing of their involvement in historical events. When 
their records of privation, sacrifice, and bravery are 
compared, they are eornmendably similar in presenting the 
details of events, that were common to their observation.
Indebtedness is acknowledged to the staff personnel 
of the Nebraska State Historical Library, the Omaha Public
Library, and the University of Omaha Library for their 
kind assistance, or suggestions, during the research phase 
of the paper. Especially appreciated has been the guidance 
and scholastic inspiration afforded the writer by Dr.
Roy M. Robbins, Professor of American History, University 
of Omaha•
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND
Westward expansion of the United States was forced 
by several principal groups. The most important of these 
was the immigrants; miners, trappers, traders, ranchers, 
and farmers, most of whom traveled toward the new lands 
west of the Mississippi in trains of white-topped Conestoga 
wagons•
Protection for the immigrants was provided by an­
other important group--the United States Army. Garrisoned 
in bleak and wretched forts that became the nuclei for 
primitive and bustling towns, cavalrymen aged rapidly or 
died young in pursuit of the elusive Plains Indians,
Transportation and supply for the Mest first de­
manded the important services of the freight wagon and 
stage coach organizations. These groups were later sup­
planted by the builders and. operators of railroads. It was 
the Union Pacific and the Northern Pacific that helped spell 
the finish of the vigorous Sioux Indians, These, railroads, 
built by the sinew of Chinese and Irish immigrant laborers, 
provided a medium for accelerated movement of foodstuffs, 
manufactured goods, people, and troops between the outposts 
of ■civilization and the economlcallv substantial. Eastern
States®
The odoriferous and avaricious buffalo hunters 
played a vital role in curbing the Western Indians. These 
killers of the plains left bleached bones, where, only 
several seasons before, the shaggy beasts had grazed. In 
destroying the Indians1 commissary, they eliminated the 
economic underpinnings, of the dreaded plains tribes*
The impact of these groups rip on the primeval West 
was repetitious of the course of history as' it had happened 
east of the Mississippi. Initially, the few white men 
venturing into the trans-Mississippi prairies and Rocky 
Mountains aroused little more than curiosity in the Indians. 
Of course, most of these first adventurers were traders and 
trappers, who did not decimate the buffalo herds, assets 
considered most tangible by the .Indians.
With the arrival of increased numbers of immigrants 
v/hen gold was discovered in Montana, Colorado, and finally 
in the Black Hills of South Dakota, the Indians divined the 
ultimate effect on their hunting economy. By 1875, the more- 
responsible Indian leaders, namely, Red Cloud and Spotted 
Tail of the Sioux, realized that their nomadic way of life 
was ended.
During their long fight against the civilized in­
vasion, the Sioux occasionally won Individual battles. These 
victories were attained through shrewdness, startling
courage, and sacrifice of 'life during charges into the -gun-, 
fire of the Great Father1s soldiers.. It is unlikely that 
any course other than vigorous resistance by the Sioux 
could have occurred. The Indians had every reason to re­
ject a system that was diametrically opposed to their concept 
of the good life. Over the years, though, the tribesmen 
were battling a never-ending tide of enemy manpower.
It was the United States Army that delivered the coup 
de grace. Western military forces, assigned the task of 
placing the defiant, painted bands onto the reservations, 
were thinly spread throughout numerous small forts. In 
fulfilling their assignment, it did not matter tn a t (L3.n 
expedition was bloodied at the Rosebud.or another destroyed 
at the Little Big Horn. The persistent government forces, 
supplied from areas beyond the Indian:s reach, continually 
harried and finally forced the white man?s will on the 
Sioux. Even Crazy Horse, one of the most valiant protectors 
of the old way could see in 1877 that he must walk the white 
man’s road. Farmers and ranchers were to take possession of 
the lands, where once the great, black herds had pastured.
Over the tumultous years of Sioux conflict, be­
ginning with Lieutenant John L. Gratten’s foolish death In 
1854, and continuing until the Battle of Wounded Knee cf 
1890, the names of white and Indian leaders were common 
knowledge. In 1876, Sitting Bull, Red Cloud, Spotted Tail,
Crazy Horse, Ifump, and Gall-.were leaders of the Sioux 
Indians* Power- among the whites was actively invested in 
Army officers who possessed distinguished records* Among 
these notable soldiers were Sherman, Sheridan, Terry, Custe 
Gibbon, and Crook*
Of the three distinct groups comprising the Sioux 
Nation— -the Dakotas, Nakctas, and Lakotas~~.it was the 
Lakotas who were the dreaded enemy of 1876* Since all 
members of the major divisions were properly called Sioux, 
specific reference will be made to the Army’s great antago­
nist, the Lakotas, known as the Teton Sioux, or e&rlier- 
Dwellers of the Prairie* The seven tribes that comprised 
the Teton Sioux were: the Oglalas, meaning, Scatter One1s 
Own; the Brules, or Burnt Thighs; the hinneconjoas, or Thos 
Who Plant by the Stream; the Cohenonpas, or Two Kettles, as 
they were more commonly known; the Hunkpapas, or Those Who 
Camp at the Entrance; the SIhasapas, or the Blackfeet; and 
the San Arcs, or "Without Bows*^ Allied with the Teton 
Sioux In their f ight against the white man, were the Arapa- 
hoes and the valiant, impetuous Northern Cheyennes* The 
Teton Sioux, more hostile to the westward march of civi­
lization than any other Plains Indians, mounted a .fierce
52
and desperate resistance to the inroads of the v;asicu.
Events of 1876 were crucial to the lives of Indians 
and white men alike. The struggles in Montana, Wyoming, 
and South Dakota signaled the end of one civilization and 
the dominance of another. These affairs, most tragic for 
the mighty Sioux, were the culmination of repeated failures 
to establish mutual faith, respect, and understanding 
between the antagonists.
Lack of rapport betv/een the Sioux Indians and the 
United States Government stemmed from political, economic, 
and cultural differences. While these factors were rela­
tively simple among the Sioux, they were complex matters 
among the Americans. The intense preoccupation of the Y/hite 
man with these elements was motivated by a desire for ma­
terialistic achievement. An aggressive spirit, resulting 
from this background, was imparted to the relations the 
Western pioneers experienced with the Plains Indians,- who 
frustrated the materialistic aim of the Americans. To 
appreciate tne importance of the last great Sioux war, It 
is necessary to recount the major political and economic 
developments that initially opened and then widened the 
long trail to the troubles of 1876.
o
Wasleu is tne Dakota word for white man. The 
original meaning was TcanJt get rid of them*.n
Robert H. Ruby, The Oglala Sioux, Warriors in 
Transition (New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1955), p. 14,
6in a political sense, the problem was initiated in
the Government’s establisned policy of locating the Plains
Indians on two separate and enormous reservation areas.
During initial discussions of this plan, the reservations
were simply referred to as the north and the south Indian
3 -groups, or-colonies* it was conceived that the Comanches, 
Kio was, Cheyennes, and- other lesser tribes of the Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Texas areas would be established on the southern 
reservation, in the present state of Oklahoma* Sioux, 
Araphoe, Crow, and Pawnee tribes were to be confined to the 
northern reservation, located north of the Platte Paver and 
we st of the Mi ssouri•^
'Movement of immigrants to the Far West and Pacific 
coastal areas required clearance of the Indians from the 
Central Plains areas If continuous turmoil between the 
wagon trains and marauding warrior bands was to be mini­
mized. Travel to the new northwest territories was over the 
Oregon Trail, through Nebraska, along the North Platte River 
to South Pass. The southwest territories, obtained as a 
result of the Mexican War, were served by the Santa Fe 
Trail that penetrated the plains through Kansas* Since
^ James C • Mai in, ’'’Indian Policy and Westward Ex- 
p an s i on, 11 Hu man 5. s tic S t n d iss, II, No« 3« Bulletin of the 
University of Kansas, XXIX, No* 17 (November 1921), 
pp. 77-78.
M^emoirs of William T a Sherman (2d ed.; ITow York; 
B*. Appleton & Co*, 1886), p. 435.
7primary interest in this study concerns conflicts of 
interest between the Sioux Indians (a northern group) and 
the Government, discussion of major events will accent 
efforts to restrain this formidable people.
In early relations with the' Indians, the United
States Government determined it was cheaper to feed, bribe,
and cajole, than to fight. The Treaty of Laramie of 1351,
concluded with the Sioux and the other northern bands, was
a manifestation of this policy. Major provisions of the
agreement permitted ,!. . . the Government to establish
roads, military and other posts, within their territory,"
granted annuities of trade goods and food to the Sioux for
fifteen years, and designated specific tracts of land as
hunting areas located north of the North Platte for
individual, tribes. The Indians1 rights and claims to other
5
lands were not abandoned.
The first agreement at Laramie .was only a.partial 
success; fifteen years of comparative peace was observed on 
the northern plains. During this interlude, the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act was introduced by Stephen A. Douglas, the 
Democratic Senator of Illinois. This proposal, passed, by 
Congress in 1854, was of immediate importance because of 
the strife it activated between the pro-slavery and
5
Charles J. Kappler, Indian. Affairs. Laws and 
Treaties, Vol. II: Treaties (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 3.904*57 PP* 594-95/
anti-slavery forces over the settlement of Kansas. The dis­
placement effects of the Kansas-Nebraska Act on the un­
suspecting Plains Indians was inherent in the basic aims of 
Senator Douglas.
In the ante-bellum era, Douglas was one of the 
strongest advocates for construction of the Pacific rail­
road. A northern, central, and southern route had been 
.surveyed. Proponents of the southern route, through Texas 
and New Mexico, stated the railroad would pass through 
organized areas, while the northern and central routes 
would cross unorganized territories. Passage of the 
Kans&s-Nebraska Act countered the southern argument and 
also initiated the settlement of these territories prior to 
the Civil War. Even before the iron rails of the Tinion 
Pacific penetrated the prairies, a wedge of white occupancy 
was being driven between the northern and southern Plains 
Indians. Completion of the Union Pacific Iiailroad hastened, 
the occupation of Nebraska and made the north-south reser­
vation policy a reality. The buffalo herds of Nebraska 
were short-lived after completion of the railroad through
the Platte Valley. By 1875, they were extinct on that
7
portion of the Great Plains.
6iv la lin , op. c l t . , pp . 4 8 - 4 9 .
7
E. Donglas Branch, The Hunting of the Buffalo 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), p. 203.
9Fifteen years of peace with, the Teton Sioux were 
terminated in 1866 by the obtuse conduct of the Government, 
In the spring of that year, arrangements were made to renew 
the provisions of the 1851 Treaty of Laramie, Concurrent 
with renegotiations, the United States Army organized a 
construction party at Fort Laramie for the purpose of es­
tablishing strong points along the Bozeman Trail. On de­
termining the purpose of these military preparations, the 
most militant Sioux, under the leadership of Red Cloud,
O
angrily withdrew from the parleys.
Under that chieftain1s aggressive leadership, the 
Teton Sioux actively harassed travel and military activity 
along the portions of the Bozeman Trail that passed between 
Fort Laramie and the eastern slopes of the Big Horn 
Mountains. From 1866 until the summer of 1868, Red CloudTs 
followers gave the occupants of Forts Phil Kearney, Reno, 
and C. F. Smith no respite from continuous observation, 
feints, and deadly attacks. The primary engagements of 
this period were: the massacre of Captain William J• 
Fetterman1s column on December 21, 1866, at Fort Phil 
Kearney; the fight with Captain James W, PowellTs wood­
cutters, August 2, 1867, near Fort Phil Kearney, which is 
now- called the Wagon Box Fight; and the skirmish near 'Fort
Q
Ruby, op. cit., p. 91.
C. P. .Smith, August 1 , 1867, or the Hayfield Fight#
Occupation of Forts Phil Kearney, Reno, and C# F# 
Smith ?/as terminated in August 1868, by negotiation of the 
second agreement between the Teton Sioux and the Govern­
ment- -the Treaty of Laramie of 1868#
Closing of the forts resulted in termination of 
travel over the Bozeman Trail to Montana# The latter Treaty 
of Laramie has been described as an agreement in which the 
Government granted the desires of another party and gained 
nothing in compensation# This contention ignores the west­
ward ' construction progress of the Union Pacific# By 1868, 
the railroad terminal at Cheyenne, within the Rocky Mountain 
region, provided direct northward routes to Montana, west of 
the Big Horn Mountains, through safer territory. In brief, 
the wagon road through the western hunting grounds of the 
Teton Sioux was not worth a fight.^
In 1871, the sanctity of the game preserve was 
threatened by the projected Northern Pacific Railroad#
Luring the summer of that year, a survey party wended its 
way to the south bank of the Yellowstone. No hostiles were 
sighted during that survey# In 1872, the parties were under 
constant survellience by the Sioux and subjected to a de­
termined attack by groups of Sioux warriors. Again, in the
9 .
Robert G. Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the
Settlement of the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma
P??7i“ i 9 ^ ” TnL94T'
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summer of 1873, a party accompanied by George A, Custer and 
the Seventh Cavalry reviewed the proposed Yellowstone route# 
Custer’s force experienced two sharp fights with the Tetons 
along the north bank of the Yellowstone.^
While the security of the Yellowstone) valley hunting 
grounds was being threatened, rumors were circulating that 
mineral wealth abounded in the Black Hills. To confirm or 
dispel these stories, Lt. Col. George A. Custer led the 
Black Hills Expedition of 1874 to that portion of South 
Dakota.^ To the Teton Sioux, the Black Hills were a 
treasured hunting and camping site-rich in game, good 
water, grass for the pony herds, and refuge from the ex­
tremes of summer heat and winter v/inds. The Teton Sioux 
venerated the Hills, calling them their "Meat Pack".^ 
Although Custer1s Expedition was not attacked, the Sioux 
were indignant over what they considered unjustified tres­
passing of property protected by the Laramie Treaty of 1868.
Another Black Hills Expedition of 1874 confirmed the 
Indians’ suspicion that the Government would not abide by
^Mar-k H. Brown, The Plainsmen of the Yellowstone 
(Hew York: G* P. Putnam’s Sons, 196TT, pp. 196-209.
IT
xRalph K. Andrist, Tne Long Death: The Last Days 
of the Plains Indian (New York: Macmi11an Co., 1964),
pp. 244-45.
1 ? ~ riiassrick, op. cit. » p. 75.
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the provisions of the treaty. This time, the column was 
led by Lt. Col, Richard Irving Dodge and accompanied by 
Professor Walter P, Jenny, of the School of Mines, New York 
City, Both the Custer and Dodge Expedition reported the 
presence of gold in the mountain streams#
This information launched an Influx of miners into 
the Black Hills, As if prompted by second thoughts, the 
Government directed closure of the Black Hills to white 
settlement. Cavalry patrols were dispatched to turn back 
prospectors. In spite of these official efforts, determined 
gold seekers found their way through, or around the patrols 
and the mining population of the Black Hills increased*""
By 1874, it was becoming evident to the Teton
Sioux that promises made at Port Laramie in 1868, to
observe the sanctity of Indian treaty property, were to be 
broken. Although the Indians had never completely ceased 
their forays against ranchers, fanners, and travelers, the 
proposals for increased war against the white men gained 
popularity among the Sioux, Subsequent intensive military 
action has often been justified on the basis of the Sioux
S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
the Interior, 44th Cong,, 1st Sess,, 1875, House ex.
Doc, 1 , Part 5, pp*. 683-85*
^^ Do ane Rob in s on, A History of the Dakota or Sioux 
Indians (1904 ed. repub,; Minneapolis: Ross 5c Haines,
Inc,, 1956), p, 415,
depredations; but in reality, the more accurate cause lies 
In the Governments violation of the 1868 treaty.
As the tenuous situation between the Government 
and the Teton Sioux deteriorated, the quality of United 
States Army commanders in the northern Great Plains area 
became a subject of prime importance* The Department of 
the Platte was a region faced with an impending confron­
tation between the Government and powerful Sioux, The 
aphorism, !iNothing succeeds like success,” applies to the 
assignment of Brigadier General George Crook to the 
command of the Platte.
Prior to assuming his new duties in the spring of 
1875, General Crook had established a reputation as a 
successful soldier. After graduation from the Military 
Academy at West Point in 1852, he had served on the West 
Coast against the Indians of northern California and 
Oregon with steadfastness and resolution. His sober traits 
and qualities of leadership accounted for his promotion to 
the brevet rank of Major General during the Civil War,
After Appomattox, he reverted, like many of his 
rapidly promoted contemporaries, to a lower rank in the 
peace-time army. Crook continued on active duty in the 
actual rank of Lieutenant Colonel, but v/as addressed and 
referred to as General, in deference to his wartime brevet 
rank. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General on
October 29, 1873.15
General Crook’s assignment to command the De­
partment of the Platte was in. response to the need foi’ a 
capable Indian fighter. Crook1s credentials were im­
pressive. During' the years of 1871-1375, while commanding 
the Department of Arizona, he had pursued, fought, and
“I
defeated the murderous•Apaches.' His victory over the 
Southwest tribes was followed by their placement on 
reservations. Although some of the Apaches subsequently 
bolted from the reservations and resumed depredations, 
Crook’s methods in subjugating them had been noted and 
were applied by his successors.
Warfare In the Southwest was characterized by 
several features. The most generally accepted trait of 
Apache fighting was the extreme cruelty with which the 
Indians treated captives, or the wounded. The elaborate 
atrocities practiced upon these unfortunates were hor­
rendous because of the fiendish ingenuity displayed in ex­
tracting the last ounce of suffering from the victims. A 
less acknowledged characteristic of Apache warfare was the 
inability of these desert warriors to unite when faced 
with a common enemy.
15 / \Marvin ?. Schmitt (ecL )? General George Crook.
H 1 s Autob1ography (New ed. 5 Uorman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1960), p. 183.
•*~°Pbld. 5 pp. 163, 187.
15
Between 1871 and 1875, when Crook .commanded the De­
partment of Arizona, the Array fought only small groups of 
renegade Apaches from the Chiricahua, Apache Mohave, and
Tonto tribes* As one official stated, they were n. . • di­
rt 17vided into about as many tribes as there are families.
While this proclivity for division gave them a mobile and 
elusive quality, the small groups of Indians were unable to 
withstand attrition, fight off the relentlessly pursuing 
.cavalry, and simultaneously support their dependents, who 
invariably accompanied them*
A surprising facet of Apache fighting was the suc­
cess the Army experienced in recruiting scouts from defeated 
bands, and hope for preferential treatment by the Government 
were motives for turning Indian against Indian* Again, love 
of fighting-~even engaging other Apaches— appeared to be 
reason enough for some individual Indians to accept white 
man’s pay. The effectiveness of the Apache scouts was un­
questioned; no one could trail, or read the subtle signs of 
enemy passage as skillfully. No white scouts could persist 
so unflaggingly in pursuit as the natives who seemed im­
pervious to the tortures of the Southwest: the body-searing 
heat, suffocating dust of the trail, the stale water of 
murky holes, and hot canteens, or sometines no water for
*}
••'U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2, 
p. 450.
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long stretches of the march# The Apache, like the Bedouin, 
had adapted to his inferno# The v/hite man did not possess 
the physical and mental toughness of the desert Indians#
As products of individualistic behavior, the Apache 
scouts required extremely firm leadership. The Army13 suc­
cess in molding these desert wildcats into some semblance 
of a partisan body is attributed to the peculiar talents of 
A1 Sieber, Crookes Chief of Scouts In Arizona. Sieber was 
unique in commanding the loyalty of his Apaches while- main­
taining undisputed dominance over them* He possessed the 
gift of knowing when trouble was due from one, or several, 
of the scouts# This insight, together with a stern mien 
and heavy hand for offenders of his discipline, accounts 
for his success in carrying out General Crook1s policy of 
applying Indian against Indian.
Raiding in small groups of warriors from temporary 
encampments, the Apaches could strike with the dispatch of 
a lightning bolt and disappear as rapidly# To achieve suc­
cessful pursuit, General Crook ordered small mobile cavalry
columns on the trail of murdering and horse-stealing
]0
raiders# Mobility of the cavalry was enhanced by 
abolishing the time-honored wagon trains, that normally
18l)3n L# Thrapp, A1 Si e be r Ch i ef  of Scouts (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), pp* 173-74.
^Crook, on. cit# 3 p. 175.
17
supported troops and mounts with food, ammunition,.and 
essential forage* Horses subjected to rigorous field duty 
required a supplemental ration of corn; well-bred horses 
weakened, on a prolonged diet of grass* The Indian’s 
mustangs were adjusted to the scanty fare of their natural 
habitat* To conserve the strength of their war horses, 
some warriors--particu.larly the Teton Sioux--took two 
horses when on a raid. A utility horse provided transpor­
tation to the battle field, and the prime war horse which 
was led to the site of conflict, was mounted only when a 
fight was imminent.
In place of the wagon trains, General Crook borrowed 
a page from the miners and early Spanish freighters; he es­
tablished the mule train as the medium of troop support. 
Mules were cantankerous, but tough, sure-footed, and could 
follow the troops into the heart of a desert broken with 
arroyos, or into the low boulder-strewn mountains. An im­
portant tactical reason for employing mile trains was to 
minimize the telltale dust cloud that marked the advance 
of a column when accompanied t>3r a wagon train. The troops 
had to pursue the renegades into rough country because the 
Apaches favored broken hills, or mountain terrain, for 
raising their temporary camps. In the event of attack, the 
braves could engage their enemies in a holding action, 
while the families escaped.
Success In fighting the Apaches can he attributed to 
several factors; first, the lack of cohesion among the 
Indians--even within one band--that resulted in their 
fighting as small groups; secondly, success of the Govern­
ment in utilising Apache scouts; and lastly, assuring mo­
bility of cavalry columns by use of mule trains for lo­
gistic support. The commendable results Crook obtained in­
dicates the validity of his methods. Indian scouts and 
mule trains would be employed in his subsequent campaigns. 
However, fighting small groups of warriors in Arizona might 
have deadened, the great Indian fighter’s realisation that 
other tribes, in other places, could be capable of united 
resistance.
Ykhen General Crook moved to Omaha, he assumed a po­
sition that was invested with considerably more political 
and military significance than his previous command. The 
Department of Dakota, commanded by Brigadier General 
Alfred H. Terry, and Crook’s Department of the Platte in­
cluded the reservations and hunting grounds of the Teton 
Sioux. These departments were located within a larger 
military unit, the Division of the Missouri, commanded by 
Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan.
George Crook was in a strange fighting environment. 
He viould soon appreciate the vast extent of territory over 
which the Sioux roamed, and the long marches he would make
19
to reach, their encampments* Extremes in v/eather en­
countered on the Northern Plains were in contrast to those 
experienced in Arizona* Oppressive temperatures of >the 
Southern Deserts wilted men and horses in July and August. 
However* during winter campaigns, the troops of the Dakota 
and tire Platte shivered under their blankets when the 
temperature dropped to minus thirty degrees Fahrenheit*
General Crook would encounter the increased war po­
tential of the Sioux. The demonstrated capability of the 
seven tribes of the Tetons to assemble their fighting 
forces into large single bodies attests to the social and 
political maturity of the Northern Plains Indians. Common
social and cultural factors of their tribes facilitated
20their gathering into confederations in time of war. 
Sagacious in fighting small bands of Apaches, Crook was 
now to be pitted against an enemy who could— as a matter of 
official record--fieId one thousand warriors for a single 
occasion. No comment is available concerning Crook1s 
opinions regarding the new potential enemy. Therefore, it 
Is not known whether he was familiar with this important 
inf o rma t i on.
The average Sioux warrior was a remarkable fighting
20Robert Pennington, MAn Analysis of the Political 
Structure of the Teton-Dakota Indian Tribe of North 
America,u North Dakota History, XX, No. 5 (July 1955), 
pp. 150-55.
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man* A superb horseman, he was inured to physical dis­
comfort, and unknowing of the word fear. The Sioux was 
the product of a society that heaped adulation on the 
fighter in victory, and assured him a place among his 
ancestors if he fell in battle* Among these warriors, a 
system was practiced whereby each coup, scalp, or great 
deed, in battle was recognized as a feat, that increased 
the prowness and stature of the individual. Indeed, the 
magnificent war bonnet of the Plains Indians, comprised of 
many eagle feathers, was the crowning glory of the out­
standing warrior; each feather was representative of a
21notable deed performed in battle.
This system of recognition of bravery and adulation
of the fighting man created aggressiveness and desire for
achievement on the battlefield. Warriors were- competitive
for battle honors; if victorious, they knew they would be
praised, and admired; if they fell in combat, they would be
venerated. Live or die, they ‘could not lose--it was an un-
22
beatable 37?rstem among the Plains Indians
In view of the value placed on the Black Hills by the 
Sioux, it is remarkable that this warrior-oriented society 
did not react immediately with large scale violence against
^-kfohn G. Bourke, On the B o r de r w1tb C t o ok (Chicago: 
The Rio Grande Press, Inc., 19627, p. 278.
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the intrusion of the Custer and O'enny Expeditions in 1874. 
Final breakdown of restraint between the Sioux and the 
Government resulted from two factors: the discovery of gold 
in the Black Hills and the failure of the Allison Commission 
to negotiate the mining and mineral rights in that area with 
the- Indians. The commission, appointed by the Secretary of 
the Interior on June 18, 1875, was headed by William B. 
Allison and was comprised of eight other prominent citizens 
including Brigadier General Alfred H* Terry.
The Allison Commission began negotiations on 
September 17, 1875, at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, with repre­
sentatives of the Brules, Oglalas, Minneconjous, Hunkpapas,
Blackfeet, Two Kettles, Sans Arcs, Lower Brule, Yankton,
23
Santee, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapahoe tribes. The
Indians were divided into two parties: the larger was
willing to sell the Black Hills if a satisfactory price
could be obtained; the smaller party, composed of young
warriors, resisted sale for any price. Turmoil broke out
among the Indians and the lives of the commissioners were
threatened. Intercession by Young Man Afraid of His. Horses
24
and his warriors prevented bloodshed.
Spotted Tail, the great Brule chief, experienced in
23U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
the Interior. 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 1875, House Ex* Doc. 1, 
Part 5, p. 6 8 8 ,
e4 Ibld.. p. 689,
negotiating with the Government, requested the commission 
to state in writing the terms of their offer* Finally, on 
the 29th of September, he received the essence of the 
Government's proposal: annual rental of mining rights for 
$400,000, or outright purchase for $6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; also, 
purchase of right of way for the Bozeman Trail, or Montana
oc;
Koad, for #50,000 rental annually* At one time during
negot5_ations, the Indians had wanted subsistence for seven
unborn generations* Later, they had stated a price of
26§70,000,000 for complete purchase*
Outright relinquishment of title was never seri­
ously hoped for by the commission. The Treaty of Laramie 
of 1868 stated in Article 12 that no sale or cession of
Indian property would be considered without assent of three-
27fourths of the male Indians* This provision was con­
sidered an impossible obstacle to concluding agreement for 
sale •
The Indians and the commission failed to reach an 
agreement on the Government's offer of September 29, 1875, 
for either sale, or rental of mining rights* This impasse 
created an intolerable situation for both parties; the 
Government could not resist the political pressure of
2 5 Xbid., p. 692-93.
26It>id. . p. 700.
^Kappler, op. cit. , p. 1002.
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thwarted miners and the Indians would not tolerate vio­
lation of their treaty rights•
Resentment against the aggressive Teton Sioux had 
been accumulating over a long period within the War De­
partment and among certain groups within the Department of 
the Interior* The Northern tribesmen had vigorously re­
sisted subjugation by large military forces commanded by 
Brigadier General Henry Sibley in 1862 and Brigadier 
General Patrick Conner in 1865* , In smaller confrontations, 
typified by'Red Cloud1s War, the Indians were victorious in 
achieving their ends.
The Treaty of Laramie of 1851 had confirmed Crow 
ownership of the rich hunting grounds south of the Yellow­
stone, -between, the Big Horn Mountains and the Powder 
28River® The Sioux coveted the area and forced the Crows
o n
westward, during the period of 1855-1862, This dis­
placement created bitter enmity between the Sioux and Crow 
tribesmen, and in subsequent- tribal warfare the Sioux had 
prevailed* Indeed, favorite Sioux camping areas, the Big 
Horn and Little Big Horn River valleys were on the Crow 
Reservation area* In the summer of 1875, the Sioux were 
raiding the Crow Agency and in June, Crows were driven from
28Kappler, on, cit*, p. 595,
^George E, Hyde, Red Cloud1 s Folk (Norman: Uni­
versity of Oklahoma Press, 1957), pp, 8 8 , 92.
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the Big Horn "by a body of warriors from 1,500 Sioux lodges,,
These depredations against a tribe, essentially friendly to
white people, created dissatisfaction in the Indian Bureau
with the Teton Sioux. One prominent scholar of the causes
of the Sioux War of 1876, Mark H. Brown, avers that the
true origin of the conflict was to be found in ”, • • many
flagrant acts of aggression • • •11 committed by some Sioux,
50between 1868 and 1876.^ Mr. Brown developed this thesis 
from General Crook1 s statement that, ’’The occupation of the 
Black Hills country had nothing to do with the hostilities 
which have been in progress.” This statement, dated 
September 25, 1876, was in the General*s annual report, 
rendered after his participation in the gruelling struggles 
of the summer which witnessed the Battle of the Rosebud and 
Custer1s defeat at the Little Big Horn. ±
There was no store of good will toward the Sioux 
among other tribes and the white people, who were ac­
quainted with Teton aggressiveness. Tne Sioux War of 1876 
had its genesis in an incident, rather than the Government!s 
accumulated aggravation over a series of. Indian raids. The 
problem in this case was the deadlock created between the 
Government and the Tetons over the negotiations for the
Brown, on. cit., p. 22Se 
51v TJ. S. , Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong,, 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2 , 
p*  5 00*
Black 'Hills* The mechanics for dealing with this situation 
had been created in the establishment of President Grant1s 
Peace Policy of 1869.
The Peace Policy* frequently mistaken for the 
Quaker Policy, was simultaneously a credit and a disgrace 
to this^Tsption* s history of relations with its Indians,
The Quaker Policy embodied the appointment of Indian agents 
from a panel of ministers nominated by religious denomi­
nations, The Peace Policy was concerned with ,f. . * that 
body of principles by which the Indian was eventually 
pacified and which outlived Quaker participation in Indian 
administration,
The essence of the Peace Policy was the location of 
the nomadic tribes on designated portions of the great 
northern and southern reservations. This move was neces­
sary, not only to clear the way for westward expansion, but 
to earnestly institute a program of civilization and 
Christianization of the pagan Indians, Tribesmen who re­
mained defiant to the Government were to be placed under
53the jurisdiction of the Army,
Despite the auspicious plans embodied in the Peace 
Policy, affairs did not improve noticeably for the Indians,
^Robert M, Utley, HThe Celebrated Peace Policy of 
General Grant,u North Dakota H 1story , XX, ifo, 3 (May, 1953), 
p. 126. ~ ■ ■*"
Religious ministers were placed in charge of reservations 
as agents; not only Quakers, hut also pastors of other de­
nominations, Some proved,incapable of management and 
others, far removed from religious restraint, became sus­
piciously wealthy in handling reservation supplies, A 
program was initiated whereby peaceful Indians were to be 
assisted in accomplishing the transition from the nomadic 
life to the idyl3_Ic pursuit of agriculture. Insufficient 
implements, draft animals, and supervision were provided at 
some reservations. Drought and grasshoppers often consumed 
the pitiful crops. The frailties of the white man’s 
character and the weakness of his vaunted agricultural 
system were duly observed by the Indians; it was no wonder 
that large numbers of them chose to stay away from the 
re s e r.v a t i on s•
The punitive provision of the Pes.ce Policy provided 
the fulcrum for initiating the Sioux War of 1876. The 
lever that initiated military action against the Tetons was 
the Black Hills impasse. Events between September, 1875, 
and March, 1876, demonstrates the Government of President 
Grant moved surely and knowingly toward an armed con­
frontation with the Indians.
After the failure of the Allison Commission to con­
clude an agreement with the Sioux, the military patrols 
assigned to-keep miners and prospectors from flooding the
27
~ '54-black Hills were withdrawn. Immediately, venturous men 
poured Into the’ Hills. On November. 5, 1875, a mysterious 
meeting was convened at the White House. One news dispatch 
stated;
The president, Secretary Belknap, Generals Sherman 
and Crook had a private interview yesterday regarding 
Indian matters in general and the Black Hills in oar-. 
ticular. At the close, Secretary Chandler and General 
CoY/an were sent for and the subject was discussed 
further. The result of this conference is that the 
government will preserve a neutral position towards the 
miners who are crowding into the Black Hills in great 
numbers* Pour hundred men left Cheyenne a few days ago 
for the gold fields, and it may be said positively that 
they will not be molested by the troops. General Crock 
says that miners are crowding in from all directions, 
and that it Is Impossible to keep them out.^
Captain John G. Bourke, General Crook’s aide and 
mentor, makes oblique reference to this meeting in his work, 
On the Border with Crook:
General Crook said that at the council where General 
Grant had decided that the northern Sioux should go upon 
their reservation or be whipped, there were present 
Secretary of the Interior Chandler, Assistant Secretary 
Cowan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Smith and 
Secretary of War Belknap.
Ho reference is made to President Grant’s high level 
conference In the official documents related to the Sioux 
War of 1876. Instead, the official springboard for v/ar, as
Bi ^'Hob.1 nson, op. clt ., p • 421.
^5^ Harry H. Anderson, nA Challenge to Brownrs Sioux 
Ind i an War s The sis,:I Montana lip, gag in e of Western History, 
XII, No. 1 (January, 1962), p. 46.
jf y  s?
° Bourke, op. cit,, p. 287.
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cited in War Department Reports of 1876, was the report 
submitted by Inspector S.. C, Watkins to the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs* This report was dated November 9, 1875, 
or six days after the White House conference. The 
following statement from this report was to embody the 
Governments repressive measures against the Indians:
And yet these hostile, renegade Indians number, all 
told, but a few hundred v/arriors and these are never 
all together or under the control of one chief.
In my judgement, one thousand men, under the command 
of an experienced officer, sent into their country in 
the winter, when the Indians are nearly always in camp, 
and at which season of the year they are almost help­
less, would be amply sufficient for their capture or 
punishment. . . .  The true policy, in my judgement, Is 
to send troops against them in the winter, the sooner 
the better, and whip them into subjection® They 
richly merit the punishment for their incessant warfare 
on friendly tribes, their continuous thieving, and 
their numerous murders of white settlers and their 
families, or y/hite men wherever found unarmed.
On December 5, 1875, Zachariah Chandler, Secretary 
of the Interior, notified William W. Belknap, Secretary of 
War, that he had directed the hostile Sioux Indians, re­
siding outside reservations, to proceed to the reservations 
by January 51, 1876. They were also informed that if they 
failed to comply, n * . . they will be reported to the War 
Department as hostile Indians, and that a military force 
will be sent to compel them to obey the orders of the
37U.S., Congress, House, Military Expedition Against 
the Sioux Indians, 44th Cong*, 1st Sess*, 3.876, House Ex. 
Doc. 184, pp, 8-9.
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These instructions reached the agents at Sioux reser­
vations after mid-December; specifically, the Cheyenne River 
Agency on December 20, and the Standing Rock Agency on 
December 2 2 , 1875. A messenger dispatched from the Cheyenne 
A.gency was not able to complete the notification and return 
to the Agency until February 11, 1876. He reported that the 
Indians received the message in good humor, some replying 
that they were in the midst of hunting and would come to the 
agencies in the spring. The severity of the winter un­
doubtedly dissuaded some of the bands from making the 
journey across the bleak landscape, on skeletal ponies, that 
were half starved from the insufficient forage of the frozen 
plain. Other bands displayed a manana attitude; besides, 
why should the Great Father attack them? They were perfectly 
within their rights to hunt outside the reservation, as long 
as they remained on the unceded lands, that had been defined 
In the Treaty of Laramie of 1868. There was every reason for 
them to be hunting at this time because the agencies had run
go
short of provisions.
When January 51, 1876, arrived and only several bands 
of Indians had returned to the reservations, the mechanics 
for instituting Government reprisals were set in motion.
^A
Ibid., p. 10.
Robinson, op. clt.}.p. 422.
On February 7, 1876, Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan
received authority, by General Sherman’s endorsement on a
letter from the Secretary of the Interior, to commence
operations against the hostile Sioux® Generals Crook and
Terry were notified to carry out the request of the
Secretary of the Interior, but specific orders were not
Issued because of the uncertainty of the location of the 
AOIndians®* General Terry was Informed that General Crook
would operate in the vicinity of the headwaters of the
Powder River, Tongue River, Rosebud, and Big Horn Rivers,
where the wildest of the Tetons--Crazy Horse’s and Sitting
Bull*'s bands— were known to frequent. Geographical lines
of departmental division were to be ignored until objectives
were attained. During the initial phases of direction and
planning at General Sheridan1s Headquarters in Chicago,
Illinois, concerted actions between the two departmental
41
commanders were not required. In light of the vast 
distances involved and severe weather experienced by 
General Terry’s troops, coordinated actions would have 
been impossible in the first stage of action against the 
Sioux.
S,, Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong®, 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex® Doc. 1 , Part 2, 
p . 441.
41Ibid.
CHAPTER II
THE ATTACK ON CRAZY HORSE VILLAGE
Preparations for.the Big Horn Expedition, the 
official designation of the first campaign of the Sioux War 
of 3.876, were undertaken immediately on receipt of in­
structions by General Crook. The purpose of the expedition 
was to enforce Teton compliance with the Secretary of In­
terior1 s order that the non-reservation Sioux return to the 
agencies® Ten full companies of cavalry, from the Second 
and Third Cavalry Regiments, and two infantry companies of 
the Fourth Infantry Regiment were drawn from Forts Laramie 
and D. A. Russell* Fort Fetterman was designated as the 
concentration point for the troops, supplies, wagons, and 
pack -trains
The fighting forces were assembled into six bat­
talions, each cavalry battalion being comprised cf two 
cavalry companies, and the two infantry companies were 
organized as an infantry battalion. Command and composition 
cf the battalions were as follows: the First Battalion was 
comprised of Companies E and M, of the Third-Cavalry, com­
manded by Captain Anson Mills; Second Battalion, Companies
W . Vaughn, The Reynolds. Campaign on Powder River 
(Norman: University cf Oklahoma Press, IS61).-, p. 9*
3 2
A and D, Third Cavalry, commanded by Captain William
Hawley; Third Battalion, Companies I and K, Second Cavalry,
commanded by Captain Henry E. Noyes; Fourth Battalion,
Companies A and B, Second Cavalry, commanded by Captain
T. B. Dewees; Fifth Battalion, comprised of Company E,
Second Cavalry and Company F, Third Cavalry, commanded by
Captain Alexander Moore; Sixth Battalion, Companies C and I,
2Fourth Infantry, commanded by Captain E. M. Coates.
The column consisted of thirty officers, 662 en­
listed men, and 191 civilian employees engaged as scouts, 
wagoneers, and packers. Total strength of the expedition
was 883 men. Less than half of the column1s personnel
3were to be actively engaged with the Indians.
Logistic support was provided by eighty, six-mule 
v/agons and a pack train assembled in five divisions of 
eighty mules to each division. Cargo of the v/agon train 
consisted primarily of forage that was to maintain the
A
strength of the cavalry horses and pack mules.x
Major efforts were made to protect personnel from 
the extremely cold weather that would be encountered. Buck­
skin or woolen underwear were donned; several pairs of 
stockings of lamb!s wool covered the feet; sturdy boots or
2 lbId., p. 26, 191-99.
^Ibld., p. 26-27. 
a
Bourks, op. cit., p . 254.
S3
leggings of buffalo hide, with the fur turned inward,
covered the legs - and feet. Heavy double-breasted shirts
and blouses were worn under overcoats of buffalo, bearskin,
or beaver. As long as the wagon train accompanied the
column, cork mattresses, comforters, and buffalo robes
5
were available as bedding.
The troops were under the immediate command of 
Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds, of the Third Cavalry Regiment, 
General Crook accompanied the expedition, primarily to 
observe the feasibility of campaigning on the northern 
plains in the winter. Relations between General Crook and 
Colonel Reynolds were described by Lieutenant Bourke:
r
Crook was very kindly disposed towards General 
Reynolds, and wanted to give him every chance to make a 
brilliant reputation for himself and retrieve the past. 
Reynolds had been in some kind of trouble in the 
Department of Texas, of which he had been the commander, 
and as a consequence of this trouble, whatever it was, 
had been relieved of the command and ordered to rejoin 
his regiment#0
Concurrent with the preparations being advanced
within the Department of the Platte, were the attempts by
elements of General TerryTs Department of Dakota to mount a
column against Sitting Bull. That wily chieftain*s band
was presumed to be encamped on the Little Missouri River.
It was later discovered 'that he and his people were on the
^Ibid., p. *252-53.
6Xbid., p. 270.
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Dry Fork of the Missouri, approximately two hundred miles 
farther vie st.
General Terry* s plan required concentration of de­
tached companies of the Seventh Cavalry at Fort Abraham 
Lincoln, near Bismark, Dakota Territory* While the troops 
were moving to Fort Lincoln, the season became so inclement 
that a great number of men were frostbitten* Because of
the extreme cold and deep snow, Sheridan cancelled Terry*s
7portion of the plan* On February 27, Terry had ordered
Colonel John Gibbon, Commander of the District of Montana,
to move as many troops as he could spare to the Yellowstone
valley* Gibbon*s force finally reached Fort Pease, near
the mouth of the Big Horn on April 20, 1876* Since Terry
had been delayed, Gibbon was instructed to remain at Pease
and coordinate future movements with the Dakota Column.
Prior to departure of the Platte Column from Fort
Fetterman, Black Coal, an Arapahoe chief, told Crook that
the hostiles were encamped on the lower Powder River, about
8
150 miles from Fetterman-#. General Crook and the scouts 
formed the vanguard as the column marched briskly from B'ort
9
Fetterman on March 1 , 1876. The scouts were led by Frank 
7
U.S., Congress, House, Report of Secretary of War, 
44th Gong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Pp,rt 2, p. 442*
Bourke, op* clt., p* 250.
^Ibid., p. 254-55.
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Grouard, who claimed to he a Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islander.
Others declared him to he the son of a French Creole father
and an Oglala woman. His name was Walter Brazeau, Instead
of Frank Grouard.^0 Although suspected by some officers of
possessing conflicting loyalties, between white people and
the Sioux, Grouard was generally an efficient scout and
11enjoyed the confidence of General Crook* He rendered 
valuable service to the United States Army in the year of 
1876.
It was evident from nocturnal rifle fire into the 
encamped troops that the column was under observation by the 
Indians. On the evening of March 1 , the Indians stampeded 
the cattle herd toward Fort Fetterman and forty-five head 
could not be recovered. Abandoned Fort Reno, the first 
major landmark during the march, was reached on March 5, 
1876c
On March 7, tne wagon train and infantry battalion 
were left at Crazy Woman1s Fork of the Powder River. The 
ten cavalry companies and the pack train continued with 
fifteen days rations. The wagon train, accompanied by the 
infantry returned to Fort Reno on March 9, and there awaited 
the return of the fighting force
10Mari Sandoz, Crazy Horse (Bison Book; Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1962), p. 426.
■^Vaughn, op. cit., p. 58.
12 Ibid., p. 205.
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During March. 8 through. March 16, the column con­
tinued its advance to the Powder River. On March 16, two 
Indians, later ascertained to be members of a hunting party 
of thirty or forty braves, v/ere observed at some distance 
from the advanced scouting party. General Crook desired to 
create an impression among the hunters that the column was 
not interested in their trail. He therefore directed the 
command to halt and bivouac on Otter Creek. The General 
ordered the column to be divided into two parts. The major 
element under Colonel Reynolds, consisted of a combat force 
of about 300 men comprised of the First, Third, and Fifth 
Battalions, or six cavalry companies, accompanied by Frank 
Grouard and a portion of the scouts. This force was de­
tailed to perform a night march eastward to Powder River.
The balance of the column, commanded by General Crook, made 
up of the pack train, accompanied by the Second and Fourth 
Battalions, was to proceed to Lodge Pole Creek on the Powder 
Hiver. At that point, Colonel Reynolds* force would unite 
with the smaller portion of the command.-*-3 If the combat 
force sighted an Indian village, it was to be attacked; If 
nothing untoward was discovered, the forces would rendezvous 
as planned.
General Crook was criticized for dividing his command 
and^sending only six companies of cavalry after the 
Indians. When asked his reason for this action during
13
Ibid., p. -59-61.
subsequent court-martial proceedings against Colonel 
Reynolds, he replied: ” It was so very cold and the 
ground was frozen and it was very difficult for the 
animals to go up an incline of ten degrees# It was 
so smooth after a few had gone over it, making it 
impossible to take the pack train, so the command 
was divided# 11
Colonel Reynolds stated, at a later period, he under­
stood the purpose of the attack was to capture the village, 
accomplish maximum attrition among the Indians, run off the 
pony herds, and create as much havoc as possible# General 
Crook averred that he specifically directed Colonel Reynolds 
to sa.ve poi-’tions of the Indian* s provisions, that could be 
used by the troops# General Crook’s statement was denied 
by Colonel Reynolds, who claimed no specific orders were 
issued and he proceeded to create maximum damage through 
the employment of troops and methods as required In his 
judgment# ^
The combat force of three battalions was on the trail 
at five o*clock in the afternoon of March 16, and stumbled 
throughout the night, after the hoof marks left by the 
Indian hunting party# As the dawn light became stronger, a 
column of smoke was seen in the distance signaling the 
probable location of an Indian village# While the column 
halted, the scouts went forward to pinpoint the site of the 
encampment# At seven o*clock they returned and reported the
^ Ikid. , p# 61#
~^Ibid#
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results of their reconnaissance. A village of approximately 
105 teepees was located within a bend of the Powder River, 
on the left, or west hank, and at the foot of the heights 
on which the combat force had halted. Trees, brush, and 
boulders were interspersed among the lodges# Five, pony 
herds were grazing on the eastern perimeter of the village#
Colonel Reynolds1 plan of attack, which was well 
initiated, involved three basic, concerted movements. The 
Third Battalion, with Captains Henry E. Noyes and James Egan 
as company commanders, was to move first; Egan wa.s to charge 
the village with pistols and Noyes-was to drive off the pony 
herds. The First Battalion, with Captain Mills and First 
Lieutenant John B. Johnson as company commanders, was to 
move in after Egan!s charge, occupy the village and destroy 
it. The Fifth Battalion, under company commanders Captain 
Moore and First Lieutenant William B# Rawclle, was to move 
close to the west side of the village and take positions on 
a ridge overlooking the encampment. This was a vantage 
point where the Fifth Battalion could not only lay enfi­
lading fire, but could deny the warriors use of the same
18advantage during an attempted counterattack.
As the attacking column neared the village, it was 
sighted by a youthful pony herder. Eis ringing war whoop 
aroused the drowsy Indians, who poured from, the teepees in
16~Jbourke, op. eit. , p a 272.
various stages of savage dishabille» The warriors returned 
a spirited rifle fire at the horsemen of Captain Egan1s 
Company K, as they swept in among the teepees with blazing 
pistols-. Ali the battalions fulfilled their orders and the 
village was soon ablaze. Great quantities of dried meat, 
saddles, fixed ammunition, loose gun powder, clothing, 
gorgeous ceremonial regalia, and beautifully embroidered 
buffalo robes were destroyed. Tent poles, teepee covers, 
and miscellaneous contents soared skyward, as if erupting
from Vesuvius, when quantities of stored gun powder deto-
, 17nated.
When the Fifth Battalion moved to the ridge over­
looking the village at the onset of the attack, Captain 
Moore did not extend his troops in a skirmish line long, 
enough to prevent the warriors from occupying the north end 
of the same ridge. From this position, the Indians not 
only directed an effective rifle fire at the troops de­
stroying their village, but threatened to flank Moore’s
1 o
position. Destruction of the village was completed and 
as the fire from the Indians along the ridge increased, 
Colonel. Reynolds ordered evacuation and withdrawal. 
Immediately, the combat fore© proceeded to Lodge Pole 
Creek, to rendezvous with General Crook’s portion of the
17
Ibid., p. 276-77.
^Vaughri, op. cit., p . 101.
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'expedition. No estimate of Indians killed, or wounded was
presented. Colonel Reynolds* force lost four killed and 
19six wounded.
Some confusion exists among various authors re­
garding identification of the Indian village* Bourke, in 
*
On the Border with Crook relates:
In one of the lodges was found a wounded squaw, who 
stated that she had been struck in the thigh in the very 
beginning of the fight as her husband was firing out 
from the entrance to the lodge. She stated that this 
was the band of f,Crazy Horse, *' who had with him a force 
of the Minneconjou Sioux, but that the forty new canvas 
lodges clustered together at the extremity by which we 
had entered belonged to some Cheyennes who had recently 
arrived from the “Red Cloud11 Agency.^
Another author states the village was predominantly
pi
Cheyenne, under the leadership of Two Moon. Writers who 
dispute Bourke*s statements may not appreciate the im­
portance of Crazy Horse, or the degree of esteem he enjoyed 
among his people--both men and women--as a paramount war 
leader. If the headman of the village was Crazy Horse, the 
woman would have known and undoubtedly been proud tc ac­
knowledge membership in his band.
At sundown on March 17, Reynolds* force reached the 
assembly point in an exhausted and famished condition. On
1 9 Ifcld., pp. 212-13.
20sourko, op. cit., pp. 276-77.
23‘Stanley Vestal, Sitting Bull, Champion of the Sioux 
(New ed; Norman: University of" Oklahoma Press, 1957),
p. 140.
departing from General Crook, trie combat force had taken
one day1 s ration which was generally consumed before
reaching the rendezvous* The troops and most of the horses
had received very little rest over a thirty-six hour period,
or from the time of breaking camp on the morning of
March 16, until they paused at Lodge Pole Creek* During
that period they had fought a battle and marched seventy-
22three miles in extreme cold©
The captured pony herd estimated at 400 to 700 head
was allowed to graze along the Powder Paver, away from the
troop horses* Colonel Reynolds stated that his men were so
tired he could assure maximum security only for the cavalry
animals, in the event the Indians made a night attack, to
regain their most prized possessions* Although, no Indians
were detected in the camp vicinity, most of the herd was
23gone on the morning of March 18*
About noon of March 18, General Crook arrived in camp 
with nearly 1 0 0 conies he had recovered from Indians who had 
raided Reynolds! camp* He was initially gratified to learn 
the attack had been completed; to discomfit Crazy Horse and 
his band was particularity pleasing to the General. However, 
he was disappointed to learn that during withdrawal from the 
village, tv/o soldiers— one still alive--were left on enemy
po
Vaughn, op. cit. , p. 213.« 
load*
ground and that Indian food supplies and robes were de­
stroyed* Loss of the pony herd was considered inexcusable 
by the General*^
Return to Fort Fetterman began on March 19. Indians, 
shadowing the column, harassed the troops at night by firing 
random shots at the camp fires* . Since the primary aim of 
the Sioux and Cheyennes was to regain the ponies Crook had 
captured, the General ordered the mounts destroyed* To dis­
courage the Indians from endangering the camp.with wild rifle 
fire, the scouts killed fifty horses by cutting their 
throats. The Indians at once recognized the pitiful sounds
of the dying beasts and retired with a departing volley and
05
defiant yells. The five battalions joined the wagon train 
and infantry at old Fort Reno on March 21* No attacks had 
been made on the rear element during the cavalry's absence. 
Having rested the command during March 2 2 , the complete 
expedition departed Fort Reno on March 23. Fort Fetterman 
was reached on March 26, and the Big Horn Expedition was 
dissolved on March 2 7 . ^ 6
Continued exposure to the harsh winter had resulted 
in approximately sixty-six cases of frostbitten noses, 
hands, and feet. Two cases of inflammatory rheumatism were
24Bourke, op. cit.t p 9 280. 
ibid., pp. 280-81.
O hj
" Vaughn, op* cit., p e 214.
reported. Temperatures as low as minus twenty-three
degrees and minus tv/enty-six degrees Fahrenheit were
27
reported on March 11 and 12, respectively.
W. T. Sherman, General of the Army, reported to the 
Secretary of War that inconclusive results v/ere achieved by 
the expedition. His statements reflected the dis­
satisfaction of General Crook with Reynolds1 performance. 
Colonel Reynolds was acutely aware of his commander1s pique 
and requested in his report to the Commander of the Depart­
ment of the Platte, that his conduct of the attack be in- 
29vestigated. To his intense chagrin, court-martial
charges were preferred against him. Through these charges,
his capacity to exercise sound judgment was assailed and his
veracity impugned.^ As if to protect hiraself, he in turn
preferred charges against Captain Moore and Captain Noyes.
Moore, through failure to adequately support the troops who
destroyed the village, faced charges of cowardice before the 
SIenemy. Noyes, because he permitted his men to unsaddle 
07
^ U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2, 
p. 29.
2 8 Ibid.
OQ
Vaughn, op. cit., p. 213*
30War Department, Record Group 94, File 6160 Adju­
tant General*s. Office 1875, powder River Expedition. 
(Adjutant General’s Office is hereafter cited as AGO.)
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and make coffee during the skirmishing in the village,, was
52
charged .with neglect of duty before the enemy, ^
Captain Noyes was the only defendant who emerged 
from the trials with his reputation intact© Moore was not 
found guilty of cowardice, hut was judged guilty of the 
charge of conduct prejudicial to good order and military
•Z *2
discipline. Regardless of the phrasing, Moore*s career
5  A
was ruined and he resigned in 1879. " The trial of Colonel
Reynolds was punctuated with hitter statements against his 
detractors and disputes with General Crook regarding in­
structions the General maintained he delivered verbally to 
Reynolds* Hence, the case appears to rest on one man*s word 
against the other*s. Reynolds was found guilty of not 
obeying the Departmental Commander*s orders and was sentenced 
to be suspended from rank and command for one y e a r * ^  Subse­
quently, he was notified that President Grant had remitted 
the sentence* As with Captain Moore, Reynolds could not
overcome the stigma of substandard conduct and retired in
56
1877, for physical disability.
3 2 ibid„
3 3I b M .
■34.
'Vaughn, op. cit. 9 p. 186.
War Department, Record Group 94, Pile 6160 AGO
1875,. Powder River Expedition.
56Vaughn, op. cit,, p. 178.
The treatment of Reynolds and Moore may appear some­
what drastic* However, General Crook faced the necessity 
of tightening officer discipline when the enlisted men 
muttered a.gainst their leaders for permitting a wounded' man 
to be captured by the Indians* Troop morale, on future cam­
paigns, would have been seriously compromised unless he 
moved to correct deficiencies in leadership* All defendants 
possessed excellent records of brave and faithful service 
during the Civil War* Reynolds, a brilliant man, had 
served as Professor of Engineering at Washington University 
in St* Louis, Missouri. Examination of the minute details 
of the conflict at Crazy Horse village, reveals the im­
possibility of completing all phases of General Crook1s 
verbal orders, If given.
Captain Anson Mills stated in his summary of the 
action, 11 Owing to the age and feebleness of Colonel Reynolds 
and the bitter feud that existed In our regiment (the Third 
Cavalry) • • . , this attack on the village on Powder River
, 57
proved a lamentable failure.1. Although Colonel Reynolds 
was only fifty-four at this time, he may have aged rapidly 
under the burdens of frontier- military life. Captain Mills* 
words intimate the existence of a controversy within the 
Third Cavalry prior to the expedition. Neither the subject
■^ ^Anson Mills, My Story, ed. C, H. Claudy (Wash­
ington : Pre ss of Byron S . Adams, 1918), p . 166.
47
of the feud., or the names of the officers who were parties 
thereto are discussed in his hook.
The United States Array in the nineteenth century 
was a likely organization in which to incur official 
censure. Rugged conditions created a necessity for hard 
discipline, among personnel with highly individualistic 
characters. J. W. Vaughn presents the situation clearly:
It was inevitable that men of strong personalities 
would clash, when cooped up within the narrow confines 
of the frontier posts. Officers spent much of their 
time sitting as judges during trials of court-martial 
proceedings. Often three or more families would live 
in the same house under very primitive conditions, 
which gave rise to many petty conflicts. There are 
many cases of officers being discharged or forced to 
resign because of personal spite and jealousy. I have 
been told by retired army officers that there are but 
few career officers who have not at some time been 
tried by court-martial for some petty offense. . . . .  
The phrase "conduct unbecoming a.n officer and a 
gentleman11 covered a wide variety of real or fancied 
sins. The rigid moral code of personal conduct during 
the period made it possible for the most innocent act 
to be misconstrued, and the small garrisons were hot­
beds of gossip, talebearing, and personal feuds.
Colonel Reynolds had many friends and his court- 
martial undoubtedly damaged Crook1s image In. their eyes. 
Lieutenant Colonel William B. Royall, one of Reynolds* sub­
ordinates in the Third Cavalry Regiment appears to have 
carried his resentment against Crook for many years. In the 
subsequent Battle of the Rosebud, a near disastrous battle­
field condition arose from the wide separation in the
^p
Vaughn, op. cit.s p. 175.
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tactical positions assumed by Crook and Royall. Lack of 
cooperation may have "been motivated by Royall1s resentment.
Even with the failure to achieve the detailed re­
quirements of General Crook, the destruction of Crazy Horse 
village yielded one important- military lesson; winter cam­
paigns could be conducted. Although Army combat forces 
would experience extreme discomfort, winter attacks were to 
be disastrous for the Indians. Women and children would be 
without shelter, and food would be difficult to obtain with, 
winter-weakened ponies. There is no evidence the Indians 
were awed by these implications, judging from their resolute 
defiance of the Army. The successes of Red Cloud1s War 
during 1866-68, provided an incentive to fight for their 
convictions. General Crook would have s. hard summer in 
1876.
CHAPTER III
BATTLE OF THE ROSEBUD
Continuation of the Government’s punitive policy 
against the militant portion of the Teton Sioux was un­
questionably necessary after Reynolds’ attack on the Crazy 
Horse village. Inconclusive results, as referred to In 
General Sherman’s report to the Secretary of War, alluded 
to failure in accomplishing a basic objective--forcing the 
recalcitrant Indians onto the reservations. Sioux and 
Cheyenne inhabitants of the destroyed village became har­
bingers of the Government’s hardened resolution against 
nomadic people who wished to live alone and removed from 
the white man’s way*
Preparations for additional thrusts against the non­
reservation Tetons inaugurated a series of movements that 
were to be described as the Big Horn and Yellowstone Expe­
dition. Approval for continuing the action was considered 
by General Sheridan to be embodied in the directive of 
February, 1875, that authorized the Big Horn Expedition.1 
The Lieutenant General commanding the Division of the Mis­
souri and the General of the Army were in rapport
50
concerning the requirement for continued action and appear 
to have considered extensive discussion of this subject 
unnecessary.
Movement of troops and supplies were underway in May 
of 1876 to effect the concentrationo required for the three- 
pronged plan of attack favored by Sheridan and Sherman*
This tactic had been successfully employed in 1874-75 
against the hostile Comanche, Kiowa, and Cheyenne tribesmen 
of the Southern plains* General Sheridan ordered 11 * * • 
three distinct columns to be prepared to move to a common 
center, where the hostiles were supposed to be . • • *,!^
Personnel for the columns were drawn from the De­
partments of the Platte and Dakota* Points of origin for 
the troops and supplies were in Montana, Dakota, and on the 
North Platte, The three columns were to move simultaneously 
against the Indian encampment, thus decreasing the likeli­
hood of their avoiding interception. In a letter to the 
General of the Army, dated May 29, 1876, General Sheridan 
stated:
The organization of these commands and what they 
expect to accomplish has been as yet left to the de­
partment commanders. I presume that the following 
will occur:
General Terry will drive the Indians toward the Big 
Horn Valley, and General Crook will drive them back 
toward Terry; Colonel Gibbon moving down on the north 
side of the Yellowstone to intercept. If possible, 
such as may want to go north of the Missouri to the
2Ibld., p. 29*
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Milk River*
The result of the movement of these three columns 
may force many of the hostile Indians hack to the 
agencies on the Missouri River and to the Red Cloud 
and Spotted Tail agencies on the northern line of 
Nebraska, where nearly every Indian, man, woman, and 
child, is at heart a friend*
General Sherman opined that the troops would not en-
4counter more than 500 to 800 warriors* This estimate of 
Sioux warriors, considered as being representative of the 
non-reservation Teton strength, was credited to the Indian 
Bureau* These figures are an understatement of such gross 
magnitude that one is amazed at their acceptance by the 
highest military circles. Depreciation of Sioux capa­
bilities underscores the ArmyTs record of engagement with 
these dynamic plainsmen.* Destruction of Custer’s scouting 
fdrbe d'nd the near-defeat of CrookTs major column was the 
price paid during the Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition 
for over-confidence when engaging the Sioux.
Colonel John Gibbon, leader of the Montana Column, 
hid been ordered by General Terry,’ on February 27, to 
participate in' the Big Horn Expe'ditlon. His force,' as­
sembled at Fort Ellisy near Bozeman/ Montana Territory/
U.S., Congress, House, Military Expedition Against 
the - -Si on x Ind. 1 an s, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 1876, House Ex. 
Doc. 184, pp. 53-54.
A.'
_ - — D/S// Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
War/ 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2 , 
p.' 29/
consisted of four companies of the Second Cavalry Regiment 
commanded by Major James S. Brisbin and six companies of the 
Seventh Infantry Regiment, commanded by Captain Henry B. 
Freeman, The column was accompanied by a twelve-pound 
Napoleon field gun and two, fifty calib^eB Gatling guns. 
Transportation was provided by twenty-four government and 
twelve civilian contract wagons. Total strength of the 
Montana Column was about 478 men, including twenty-seven 
officers, 406 enlisted men and twenty civilian teamsters. 
First Lieutenant James H. Bradley, the soldier-author was 
in charge of twenty-three Crow Indians, who had been en- 
listed as scouts, and two squaw-men interpreters,
GibbonTs force departed Fort Ellis on March SO, and 
had bivouaced at Fort Pease, opposite the mouth of the Rose­
bud, from April 20, until May 10, 1875, The delay at Fort 
Pease had been caused by the inability of the Dakota Column 
to move westward In March, 1876, and participate in the Big 
Horn Expedition. It was anticipated some of the Sioux 
would cross the Yellowstone to escape the pressure of the 
converging Dakota and Platte Columns, Until he joined with 
Terry on June 9, Gibbon guarded the north bank of the 
Yellowstone River and dispatched patrols through the
5
James H, Bradley,. The March of the Montana Column, 
ed, Edgar I. Stewart (New ed.; Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1961), p. 50.
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Yellowstone Valley.
General Terry* s' Dakota Column was concentrated at 
Fort Abraham Lincoln. His force comprised of the twelve 
companies of the Seventh Cavalry Regiment, two companies of 
the Seventeenth Infantry Regiment, four companies of the 
Sixth Infantry, and forty Indian scouts. A battery of three 
potent Gatling guns, manned by detachments from the Twenti­
eth Infantry Regiment, was attached to the column and gener­
ally supported the Seventh Cavalry. Total strength of the 
column was 1,200 men. A scouting force of forty Indians, 
mostly Arickaras, was under Bobtailed Bull and Included 
Custer1s favorite scout, Bloody Knife. The supply train,
7consisting of .150 wagons, v/as accompanied by a beef herd.
Lieutenant Colonel G. A. Custer was first assigned 
to command the Dakota Column, but was later relegated to com­
mand only his regiment, the Seventh Cavalry. Custer had be­
come embroiled in an acrimonious political dispute concerning 
the malfeasance of W, W. Belknap, Secretary of War. In 
testifying before a Senate Investigating Committee, Custer1s 
statements reflected adversely on President Grant1s ad­
ministration and implicated Orvil Grant, the Presidents 
£*
U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th. Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. l,’Part~2, 
p. 472.
7
Brown, op. cit.» p. 255.
brother*8 Grant’s displeasure was manifested in official 
harassment of Custer; he was ignored by the President when 
he tried to apologize; he was arrested in Chicago, during 
his return to Bismark, for failure to sign the departing 
officers* register at the War Department* Only by inter­
vention of the gentlemanly Terry was Custer permitted to 
participate in the expedition--and certainly not as 
Commander of the Dakota Column*
Both the Montana and the Dakota Columns relied on 
wagon trains for the movement of supplies* No real capa­
bility for management of pack trains had been developed in
9
the Department of Dakota* The wagon train of the Dakota 
Column carried about 250 pack saddles, to be used on the 
mules of the wagon train, if the need should arise. Re­
supply of Terry’s and Gibbon’s columns was to be provided 
by steamboat delivery of provisions to a point on the
Yellowstone known as Stanley’s Stockade, near the mouth of
1 0
Glendive Creek*
On the morning of May 17, the Dakota Column departed
0
Robert C. Prickett, ’’The Malfeasance of William 
Worth Belknap,” North Dakota Elstory, XVII, No. 1 
(January 1950), p. 50.
9U.S., Congress, -House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876‘, House'Ex. Doc. “l7"Tart7~2, 
p. 460*
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Fort Abraham Lincoln to join the Montana Column on the 
south bank of the Yellowstone at the Glendive Creek supply 
depot. Progress was extremely slow because the heavily 
laden wagon trains had difficulty on trails softened by 
spring rains*
General Crook’s forces had concentrated at Fort 
D. A. Russell, Wyoming- Territory, and at Medicine Bow, 
ninety miles west of the Union Pacific Railroad. Troops, 
wagons, and pack trains from these points were united on 
May 25, 1876, at Fort Fetterman, to become the Platte 
Column.^ The primary subordinate commanders, immediately 
under General Crook were Lieutenant Colonel W. 3. Royall, 
Third Cavalry Regiment, and Major Alex Chambers, Fourth 
Infantry Regiment* Lieutenant Colonel Royall was desig­
nated as Commander of Cavalry, and Major Chambers was 
appointed Commander of Infantry.
Major A. H. Evans, Third Cavalry Regiment,,was 
Lieutenant Colonel Royall’s subordinate in command of the 
ten companies of the Third Cavalry that were assigned to 
the expedition. These companies, or troops, were divided 
into three battalions. Command and composition of the 
battalions were as follows:
First Battalion: Commander, Captain Anson Mills.
■^J* W. Vaughn, With Crook at the Rosebud 
(Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co., 1956), pp. 4-5.
(Hereafter cited as Vaughn, At the Rosebud.)
Comp any A, commanded by First Lieutenant Joseph Lawson.
Conioany E, commanded by Captain Alexander Sutorious.
Company X, commanded by Captain William H. Andrews.
Company M, commanded by Captain Anson Mills.
Second Battalion: Commander, Captain Guy V. Henry. 
Company B, commanded by Captain Charles Meinhold.
Company F, commanded by Second Lieutenant Bainbridge
Reynolds. Company L, commanded by Captain Peter D* Vroom.
Third Battalion: Commander, Captain Frederick Van 
Vliet. Company C, commanded by Captain Van Vliet.
Company G, commanded by First Lieutenant Emmet Crawford*
Captain Henry E. Noyes, Second Cavalry Regiment, was 
also subordinate to Lieutenant Colonel Royall and was 
appointed commander of the five companies of the Second 
Cavalry. The companies and commanders that formed this 
battalion were: Company A, Captain Thomas B. Dewees;
Company B, First Lieutenant William B. Rawolle; Company D, 
First Lieutenant Samuel M. Swigert; Company E, Captain 
Elizah H. Wells; Company I, Captain Henry E. Noyes*
Major Alex Chambers of the Fourth Infantry Regiment 
commanded a-battalion made up of five rifle companies from 
the Fourth and Ninth Infantry Regiments. The companies of 
the Fourth Infantry were commanded by the following officers 
Company D, Captain Avery B. Cain; Company F, Captain 
Gerhard L. Luhn. Command of the companies of the Ninth
Regiment was as follows: Company C, Captain Samuel Munson;
Company G, Captain Thomas B, Burrowes; Company H,
1 P
Captain Andrew S. Burt.
Captain A. H. Nickerson, Twenty-third Infantry 
Regiment, and Second Lieutenant John G. Bourke, Third 
Cavalry Regiment, were assigned to serve General Crook as 
aides-de-camp.
Supplies, forage, extra ammunition, and other items 
essential to the force were transported on pack mules and 
y/agons. The column was supported by a wagon train of 103 
six-mule wagons, commanded by Major John V. Furey, who also 
served as the quartermaster. A pack train of approximately 
1,000 mules was siipervised by Chief Packer Tom Moore
While the force was being assembled at Fort Fetter­
man, General Crook v/ent to the Red Cloud Agency to enlist a 
contingent of scouts from peaceful Sioux bands. Several of 
the chiefs reacted favorably to the General’s request and 
were disposed to send some of their young men with the 
troops. When A.gent James S. Hastings returned to the reser­
vation, after an unexplained absence, the Indians lost en­
thusiasm for the venture. .Apparently, Hastings had influ-
14enced them against Crook’s proposal.
12Bourke, op. cit.» pp. 289-90.
13Brown, op. cit., p. 257.
14Bourke, op. cit,, pp. 286-87.
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On May 29, 1876, Crook’s forces crossed the Platte
River and headed north along the trail the Big Horn Ex­
pedition had. followed earlier in March. The military 
portion of the Platte Column totalled forty-seven officers
of the Chicago Times, who accompanied Crook, commented on 
management of the column:
Colonel Royall, at the outset of our march, used to 
have us on the road at 5 o ’clock in the morning, but 
General Crook, on assuming command, fixed the hour at 
6 o ’clock for the Infantry and at 7:50 o ’clock for the 
cavalry, in order that the horses might have sufficient 
rest, as he intended to make night marches In pursuit 
of the hostiles, accompanied by his pack train only, 
after the campaign had been fully developed. b
The troops reached the abandoned Port Reno on June 2 .
After several days march along the old Bozeman Trail, the 
command made camp near the site of Fort Phil Kearney about 
noon on June 5, 1876. On departing Fort Phil Kearney, the 
column made a difficult march to the junction, of Prairie 
Bog Creek with Tongue River. After darkness, on June 8 , 
there was a verbal exchange between the camp pickets and an 
unknown person. Arnold, a half-breed scout was sent by 
General Crook to investigate. Arnold replied in the Sioux 
idioms, to which'the visitor did not answer. General Crook
and 1 , 0 0 2  enlisted men*
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was upset because he was 'momentarily expecting the arrival 
of overdue Crow scouts. He believed the visitor was a
IV
member of the Crow party, who was frightened by the reply.
Earlier in the day, the Commander had received dis­
patches notifying him that the Fifth Cavalry Regiment had 
been moved from Fort Hays, Kansas, to Fort Robinson, and
that the male Indians capable of fighting had left the Red 
l ftCloud Agency.
In answer to the popular question regarding the 
whereabouts of the Sioux, a brisk rifle fire was directed 
against the camp about six-thirty o ’clock on the evening of 
June 9. The Indians had made their first appearance and 
were located on a high ridge overlooking the bivouac area 
from the north* Captain Mills was directed to repulse the 
attack with Companies A, E, I, and M. As Captain Mills was 
completing the rout of Indians on the irndge, a party of at­
tackers attempted to capture the horses by penetrating de­
fenses on the south, side of the encampment. After the 
abortive attack, a heavy picket force secured the ridge for 
the remainder of the night. This foray was believed to have 
been Crazy Horse’s fulfillment of his vow to fight Crook as 
soon as he touched the waters of the Tongue River.^
17rcid,, p. 57.
vsBssama—a—-4 w ™
^'^Bou.rke, op. cit. , pp. 295-96.
19Finerty, op. cit., pp. 59-62.
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The command was moved to the confluence of the two 
forks, of Goose Creek, where excellent water and rich 
pasturage were available. On the evening of June 14, 175 
of the long-awaited Crow scouts arrived. They were well 
mounted and armed, each warrior possessing an extra pony 
and a fifty caliber breech-loading rifle. A short time 
later, eighty-six Shoshones— -or Snakes wheeled into camp in 
splendid style with a show of military discipline. They 
had been subjected to cavalry drill by their leader Tom Cos­
grove, a former captain in the Confederate Thirty-Second
20Texas Cavalry, and Chief of Scouts at the Shoshone Agency.
Later, General Crook assembled the officers of the column
and issued instructions regarding the march against the
Sioux. The wagon train was to be parked and guarded by the
teamsters and 100 riflemen, under the command of Major John
V. Furey. Officers and men were to carry four day!s
rations, one blanket per person, and 1 0 0 rounds of ammu- 
21
nition.
Throughout June 15, the day was given over to prepa­
ration for the strike. About 175 infantrymen were to be 
mounted so the column would have increased mobility. The 
pleasure of the walk-a-he ap s, the Indian1s designation of 
the foot soldier, was short-lived after learning they were
20Brown, op. cit., p. 262.
21Bourke, op. cit., pp. 302-03.
to be assigned mules--and each man had to break his nrule 
22
to a saddle.
The command departed camp at five o'1 clock on the
morning of June 16, with a force of 1,325 men, comprised of
803 cavalry, 175 mounted infantry, 262 Indian scouts,
twenty packers and sixty-five miners, who had joined the
column. The objective was a large Sioux village supposedly
located in the canyon of the Rosebud. As the force crossed
the beautiful grasslands of the Big Horn country, great
numbers of buffalo were sighted. The Crows and Shoshones
broke from the column and their rifle fire reverbrated
across the plains as they inflicted a wanton slaughter
against the beasts. General Crook had hoped to approach
the Sioux village without alarming the Indians and was
23disgusted with the careless conduct of his allies.
At three o ’clock in the morning of June 17, Crook 
ordered the camp awakened and at six o fclock the column 
was on the march. East of the big bend of the Rosebud and 
in the vicinity of the confluence of the north and south 
forks of the river, Crook halted the still-tired column for 
a short rest. It was about eight o !clock and the Crows had 
been sent northward to obtain intelligence concerning the 
Sioux location. The command was so extended by the broken
22-^ Brown, op. cit., pp. 263.
2^Finerty, op. cit„, p. 78.
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ground along the line of march, that the end of the column
did not come into the rest area until about eight-thirty 
24
o ’clock*
Very little concern was displayed by officers and
men over impending events; the mounts grazed contentedly
and General Crook and Lieutenant Bourke sat down for a game
of cards. An aura of confidence emanated from General
Crook and he was not occupied with the realization that
momentarily he would be involved in the most extensive
25
Indian engagement in the history of the West*
Characteristic of the Sioux concept of battle, the 
field of confl-ict was of their choosing and admirably 
suited for the slashing, feinting, and veering type of 
mounted attack preferred by the Plains Indians. Topo­
graphically, the battle site was dominated by a ridge on the 
north side of the Rosebud. This ridge was oriented along a 
northeast, southwest axis and was three miles in length. 
Three short ridges extended at right angles to the main 
ridge, toward the southeast and.were separated by broad, 
shallow valleys, that emptied into the Rosebud. The north­
east end of the main ridge terminated in broken terrain, 
that bordered on the great bend of the river. As the Rose­
bud’s course turned to the north, it flowed through a
24Vro\ghn, At the Rosebud, ■p • 49.
~5 Iold., pp. 43-49.
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sriallow canyon that narrowed to about 150 yards in width.,
at a distance of about four miles north of the bend.
About eight-thirty o ’clock, sporadic rifle fire was
heard by the command, to the northwest, beyond the main
ridge. Immediately, the Crow scouts came in sight, riding
wildly. They dashed down the slopes into the alarmed
26column crying, ’’Heap Sioux! Heap Sioux! 11 The Tetons’
first charges, from the northwest and the southeast were
repulsed by the Indian Allies, while the troops were being
27directed into combat formations.
Sweeping charges and countercharges extended Crook1s
forces along the main ridge of the battlefie3_d. During the
engagement, the fighting expanded from the broken tei>rain
at the northeast end of the ridge tov/ard the southwest and
around each of the three smaller ridges in turn. The
Sioux, under the leadership of Crazy Horse, delivered well-
conceived thrusts against weakened points in the soldier’s
defenses. A prominent Indian leader, assumed to be Crazy
Horse, was observed directing the movements of the Sioux
28bands with a-flashing mirror. Always swirling from one 
salient to another, they alternately Increased and de­
creased pressure on the soldiers, thus attempting to draw
26
Finerty, op. cit., p. 84.
27
Vaughn, At the Rosebud, p. 50.
28Finerty, on. cit., p. 86.
the command into isolated formations and defeat them in 
detail#
Crook’s dispositions, on the fully invested battle­
field, -were: Noyes* battalion of cavalry and some infantry 
held the broken ground at the northeast end of the ridgej 
Mills* and Van Vliet*s battalions, supported by infantry, 
held the high position on the ridge, at the junction of the 
main ridge and the first of the smaller ridges oriented to 
the southeast# This position, later called Crook*s Hill, 
was the General’s command post# Farther down the ridge, to 
the southwest, Royall directed the fight of Henry’s bat­
talion# This force occupied a position along the middle 
ridge of the three short ridges extending southeast from the 
main ridge# Henry’s position was isolated from the Com-
OQ
mander's view and was about a mile from the command post#
General Crook was determined to occupy the Indian 
village presumed to be at the north end of the Rosebud 
Canyon. To affect reassembly of the column, he dispatched 
Captain Nickerson, one of his aides-de-camp, to Royall with 
instructions to return Henry’s battalion to Crook’s Hill, 
or the central position. Nickerson had notified Royall of 
the General’s withdrawal order three times previously, but 
the Commander of Cavalry had been unable to comply because 
of the extreme pressure exerted on their position. Captain
2GVaughn, At the Rosebud, p. 56#
Henry Had been incapacitated by a near-fatal wound. A 
bullet bad traversed bis face, below tbe eyes— entering one 
cheekbone, passing through his nose, and exiting the oppo­
site cheekbone. The Sioux, on observing a leader of the 
soldiers fall from his horse, had pressed their attack with 
increased ferocity. In their retreat with their wounded,
Henry’s force was almost overwhelmed, but was saved by the
30
long range rifle fire of the infantry.
Prior to Royall’s return, the General dispatched 
Mills’ and Noyes’ companies down the canyon with the as­
surance that he would soon support them with the remainder 
of the force. The Indians observed the withdrawal of the 
large number of troops from the center and soon concentrated 
their attacks against Crook’s Hill. The General, still 
separated from Royall, concluded he could not hold long 
against the intensified attacks of the Indians and dispatched 
Nickerson to Intercept Mills and Noyes with orders for them 
to return to the battle. The two battalions defiled from 
the canyon to the west and made a wide circuit to come In 
behind Crazy Horse’s forces north of Crook’s Hill. The 
Sioux were forming for a new attack and v/ere disconcerted to 
find themselves outmanuevered. They abruptly broke off the 
engagement and retreated to the northwest. Mills pursued
50rbid.. p. 6 0 .
31them for several miles, then returned to Crook1s position*
Still imbued with his original plan, the General
assembled his command and started north through Rosebud
Canyon. hhen he reached the point where the terrain
narrowed, the Indian Allies refused to go farther, saying
it was a death trap. The Sioux, they said, would destroy
the command when it reached the point where it had no room 
32to deploy* Frank Grouard complained that the supply of
ammunition was dangerously low. A quick inventory was
taken and ’I. • ♦ It didn’t average ten cartridges to the
33man, and that was the only thing that stopped him.ri It 
was subsequently found that the force had expended 25,000 
rounds•
The battle was over at two-thirty o ’clock In the 
afternoon, having lasted for six hours, when the Sioux 
suddenly retired. At the time of Mills’ appearance in their 
rear, the hostiles had rendered an excellent account of 
themselves, and the resulting question concerns the Sioux’s 
reason for stopping the fight. Since they had ridden all 
night to reach the battlefield and had fought all day, 
there was undoubtedly truth in the statement made by a
31Finerty, op. cit., pp. 89-92.
Vaughn, At the Rosebud, p. 65.
33,Joe LeBarthe, Life and Adventures of Frank Grouard, 
ed. Edgar I* Stewart (New ed, ; Norman: University^!
Oklahoma, 1958), p. 121.
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subsequent Indian observer: 11 They were tired and hungry, so 
they went home.r!^
Crazy Horse told officers at Red Cloud Agency in 
1877 that he had 1,500 warriors actively' engaged on the Rose­
bud battlefield and another 5,000 in reserve. Knowing the 
proclivity of the Indians to fight as individuals, it is 
difficult to conceive .the system of discipline that would
have rendered 5,000 warriors inactive, while a certain
35victory promised rich loot# There is little doubt that 
Crook would have been overwhelmed by the addition of a 
large reserve to Crazy Horse1s force.
General Crook reported ten killed and twenty-one 
wounded. Frank Grouard stated that twenty-eight were kil3_ed 
and fifty-six wounded. It is impossible to verify either 
Crook*s or GrouardTs statements. Reports from Captain 
Peter D. Vroom and Lieutenants Bainbridge Reynolds and Emmet 
Crawford, company commanders of the Third Cavalry, are not 
contained in the National Archives. The units commanded by 
these officers are said to have sustained the largest losses 
in the battle. Vaughn, who has completed extensive research
34Vaughn, At the Rosebud, p. 147.
^Oliver Knight, Following the Indian liars. A Story 
of the Newspaper Correspondents Among the Indian Cam­
paigners (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960),
p. 185.
36^
LeBarthe, op. cit., p. 122.
on this action, opines that Crook understated the magnitu.de 
of his casualties and that Grouard1s figures are closer to . 
the truth.
Neither the Indians or the cavalry could claim over- 
all victory in the fight on the Rosehud. Both sides had re­
tired in strength and required only rest and resupply to 
achieve potency in "battle. Undoubtedly, the Indians con­
sidered themselves victorious because they had successfully 
defended their village. Crook claimed victory for the 
Platte Column in his annual report to General Sheridan dated 
September 25, 1876:
At the fight on the Rosebud, June 17, the number of 
our troops was less than one thousand, and within eight 
days after that the same Indians we there fought met 
and defeated a column of troops of nearly the same size 
as ours, killing and wounding over three hundred, in­
cluding the gallant commander, General Custer himself.
I invite attention to the fact that in this engage­
ment my troops beat these Indians on a field of their 
' own choosing, and drove them in utter rout from it, as 
far as the proper care of my wounded and prudence would 
justify. Subsequent events proved beyond dispute what 
would have been the fate of the command had the pursuit 
been continued beyond what judgment dictated.^
Several tactical errors were committed, which could 
have resulted in disaster. At the .outset of battle, the 
General allowed the force to become too widely dispersed 
with the result that Royall and Henry barely escaped
Vaughn, At the Rosebud. p. 6 6 .
•20
U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex.. boc. 1, Part 2 , 
p. 498.
annihilation. Later, when he dispatched Mills and Noyes 
down the canyon, he divided his force dangerously and faced 
the possibility of being overwhelmed on the battlefield*
He recouped this error by ordering the two battalions to 
return to the ridge from the northwest, or behind the battle 
line of the Sioux.
General Crook .was greatly disappointed in the out­
come of the fight and habored bitterness toward Colonel 
Hoyall* This sentiment was demonstrated in 1886, during a 
discussion between the two men at Crook’s home in Omaha.
The scene was witnessed by Major Guy V. Henry, one Captain
Roberts and Second Lieutenant W. V. Kennon, who recorded
39the scene and conversation in his diary.
It should be noted that none of the contemporary 
newspaper accounts attached the stigma of defeat to the 
Army’s performance on the Rosebud in 1876.^ Indeed, it is 
difficult to understand how the Platte Column could have 
achieved more against the well-led and resolute enemy.
39^
Jiarlier in 1886, during a newspaper interview, 
Colonel Royall had criticized Crook for faulty generalship 
at the Rosebud. Luring the Omaha meeting, General Crook 
accused Royall of making disparaging and unfair statements 
to the public* Crook further blamed Royall and Nickerson 
for delayed response to his orders to regroup during the 
battle. Hoyall countered by saying that Crook was not 
specifically named in the newspaper article, and that he 
had responded to Crook’s orders v/hen Nickerson delivered 
them.
Vaughn, At the Rosebud, pp. 165-66.
^Knight, op. clt. . p. 141.
CHAPTER IV
JOINING WITH TERRY
Crook directed the return of his force to the site 
of the morning’s bivouac, after deciding to abandon the 
quest for the Indian village north of the battlefield.
Proper care of the wounded and decent burial of the dead 
were matters that required immediate attention. Military 
dead were covertly interred on the banks of the Rosebud, to 
prevent the Sioux from exhuming the bodies and removing the 
sc-alps.'*'
After the Shoshones completed the burial ceremony of 
a youthful horse guard, early on the morning of June 18, 
the troops broke camp on the Rosebud, The column reached 
the wagon train encampment on Goose Creek the following day. 
General Crook ordered the wagon train to return to Fort 
Fetterman, on June 21, for additional supplies and to evacu­
ate the wounded to that post for more adequate treatment.
He requested reinforcements and attempted no action other 
than to reconnoiter the area east of the Big Horn Mountains
o
and north of his encampment for Sioux forces.
1Bourke, op. cit. , pp. 316-17.
2
U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex, Doc♦"T “ Part 2, 
pp. 442-43.
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General Crook was Informed that Colonel Wesley 
Merritt would reinforce the Platte Column with the Fifth 
Cavalry Regiment. Merritt, an excellent officer who 
possessed an outstanding Civil War record, was detached 
from General Sheridan1s staff to assume regimental command 
from Lieutenant Colonel Eugene A. Carr. Colonel Merritt 
was to he delayed in joining Crook until August 3, 1876. -
While waiting for reinforcements, from June 21 
through August 3, Crook constantly moved his camp to provide 
adequate pasturage for his animals. Bourke, who continued 
to serve as his aide-de-camp, remarked that another reason 
for the many moves was to keep the troops occupied. To 
dispell the boredom of dull camp routine, personnel went 
hunting in the Big Horn Mountains for elk, deer, and 
mountain sheep, or made phenomenal catches of the succulent 
trout from clear fresh water streams.
Crook v/as impatient to receive news from Terry and 
Gibbon, but fully appreciated the difficulty of communi­
cating over the short distance that separated his force 
from the troops on the Yellowstone. The scouts constantly 
reported signs of Sioux parties beyond the perimeter of his 
camp and he was assured the country between the two commands 
was alive with hostiles. To ascertain the location and 
strength of the enemy, a party of twenty-five soldiers and
5Xbid., p. 507.
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two scouts commanded by Lieutenant Frederick W. Sibley of 
Troop E, Second Cavalry Regiment, departed camp on June 6 /
4
to make a reconnaissance toward the Little Big Horn River. 
John F. Finerty, the correspondent who accompanied this 
venture, wrote a vivid account of the group1s harrowing ex­
periences. Only by leaving their horses as decoys for a 
party of Sioux and Cheyennes, who were besieging them, were 
Sibley1s men able to slip away into the fastness of the Big 
Horn Mountains. With little rest and no food, the party 
returned fifty miles to camp, on foot, arriving on July 9.
General Crook was certain that disaster had over­
taken Terry1 s command. His fears Y/ere confirmed on July 1 0 , 
when messengers brought dispatches from Fort Fetterman,
telling of the catastrophe that had befallen the capricious 
5
Custer. This information had been relayed from Sheridan*s 
headquarters in Chicago to the Platte Column, making the 
line of communication 'between Crook and Terry over 2,000 
miles in length.
The group of dispatches received by Crook on July 1 0 , 
contained a communication from Sheridan enjoining the Com­
mander of the Platte Column to "Hit them again and hit them 
harderIn After considering his commander*s injunction,
Crook remarked, T'I wish Sheridan would come out here himself
4Finerty, op. cit., p. 113.
5
Bourke, op. cit., p. 334.
and show us how to do it*. It is rather difficult to 
surround three Indians with one soldier.!l®
The Platte Column received the first direct communi­
cation from Terry on July 12, when three courageous 
soldiers of the Seventh Infantry rode into Crook1s camp* 
These heroes were Privates James Bell, William Evans, and 
Benjamin F. Stewart* On July 19, four Crow scouts arrived 
with copies of the same dispatches previously delivered hy 
Bell, Evans, and Stewart® Terry had directed duplicate 
copies of his messages to be sent by a second group of 
couriers, because of the great risk involved in traversing 
the intervening country*
The wagon train returned with supplies from Fort 
Fetterman on July 13, accompanied by seven companies of the
Q
Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Infantry Regiments* With it 
came the unwelcomed news of Merritt1s delay, engendered by 
the threatened break-out of the Cheyenne warriors at Red 
Cloud and Spotted Tail Agencies* Sheridan directed the im­
patient Crook to withhold his force from the field, until 
Merritt could join him* Sheridan further advised that after 
Merritt had joined Crook, the reinforced Platte Column
Finerty, op. cit . t p* 129*
7U.S., Congress, douse, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Exe Roc* 1, Part 2, 
p. 465*
0
Finerty, op* cit., p. 143®
should seek and join Terry "before attempting action against 
9the hostile s. The old Shoshone Chief, Washakie, concurred, 
saying to Crook:
The Sioux and Cheyennes have three to your one, even 
now that you have "been reinforced; why not let them 
alone for a few days? They cannot subsist the great 
numbers of warriors and men in their camp, and will 
have to scatter for pasturage and meat; they111 begin 
to fight among themselves about the plunder taken on 
the battle-field, and many will want to slip into the 
agencies and rejoin their families#1
Scouting parties sent out by Crook failed to discover 
the location of the Sioux. One party consisted of half- 
breeds who investigated the Big Horn River; the other party 
made up entirely of Shoshones went to the headwaters of the 
Little Big Horn# They found large camp sites and a trail 
leading northeast in the direction of Powder River#
Prior to joining Crook, Merritt was to be engaged in 
a rear area policing action. The Fifth Cavalry patrolled a 
broad avenue, running northwest of the Red Cloud and Spotted 
Tail Agencies, over which the warring bands on the Little 
Big Horn 7/ere reinforced. .Approximately 1,000 Cheyenne 
warriors remained on those reservations and after news of 
the fights on the Rosebud and Little Big Horn, were im­
patient to join their allies.11 Colonel Merritt was informed
^Bourke, op. cit., p* 341.
10
Ibid., pp. 341-42.
11Charles King, Campaigning with Crook (New ed, ; 
Norman; University of 0k3.ahonia Press, 1964), pp. 23-24.
on July 15, that 800 Cheyenne warriors would bolt the 
reservation on the following day, fully equipped for the
lo
warpath and determined to join the Sioux, ~ After a
vigorous forced march, the Fifth Cavalry was placed in
position to intercept the Cheyennes on War Bonnet Creek#
In the short engagement with the advanced element of the
Indians, on the morning of July 16, Buffalo Bill Cody, who
accompanied the troops as a scout, killed the young chief
Yellow Hand# The surprised Cheyennes were stampeded back
to the reservation, leaving a trail of saddle bags stuffed
with Government provender#
Merritt departed Red Cloud Agency on July 18, and
proceeded to Fort Fetterman# From Fort Fetterman, the
Fifth Cavalry marched north, on July 26, and joined Crook
on August 3* The Regiment comprised of ten companies that
were divided into two battalions, each containing five
companies# The First Battalion, comprised of Companies A,
C, G, I, and M, was commanded by Major John J. Upharn, The
Second Battalion, that contained Companies B, D, E, F, and
14K, was commanded, by Major Julius K# Mason#
Counting the new arrivals, the Platte Column 
mastered 2,100 men#' The Command included twenty-five
^SIbid., pp. 24-25©
companies of cavalry from the Second, Third, and Fifth 
Regiments; ten companies of infantry from the Fourth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Regiments; 225 Shoshone scouts,
tv/enty-five TJte scouts, and thirty white and half-breed
. . . . . . .  15scouts and civilians.
Spartan preparations, typical of Crook’s combat 
marches, were directed for his move to join Terry. Each 
man was permitted to take one poncho, one blanket, an over­
coat, and only the clothing he wore. Rations for twelve to
fifteen days were provided. A mule train of 399 animals
10
would accompany the march with needed supplies. Part of
their cargo would consist of 150,000 rounds of ammunition,
3 Vin addition to the 100 rounds each man carried. * All 
superfluous baggage was stored in the wagons, which were to 
return to Forts Fetterman and Laramie after the column de­
parted. Major Furey, still serving as quartermaster, super­
vised a force of 200 wagoneers who manned the train of 160 
vehicles«
The horses were in poor condition, and under more 
favorable circumstances, would not have been subjected to 
field service. Crook’s mounts had been without grain for 
two months, subsisting only on grass. Horses of the Fifth
15Knight, op. cit., p. 253.
16Bourke, op. cit., p. 348.
17Knight, o p . cit., p. 253.
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Cavalry had Toeen weakened in thwarting the Cheyenne on War
Bonnet Creek and had subsequently made the long march to
18
join the Platte Column. Many of the poor animals were to 
die of exhaustion before any of their number would again 
feed on oats in a civilized stable; many of the cavalrymen 
v/ould become' foot soldiers and dine on horse meat before 
their mission was completed.
There was a feeling of anticipation and relief 
from boredom when the long-awaited move to join Terry began 
on August 5. In an attempt to uncover some sign of the 
enemy, the line of march proceeded northward along the 
winding Tongue River. After failing to discover the Sioux, 
trail, Crook moved westward to the Rosebud.
The command intercepted the Rosebud about six 
miles north of the bloody ground that had witnessed the 
desperate struggle between Crook and Crazy Horse, earlier on 
June 17. Riding north, the column passed the point Mills 
and Noyes had defiled from the canyon. About a mile and a 
half farther down the Rosebud, a barrier of felled trees and 
brush obstructed the floor and sides of the canyon. If the 
eight companies of the Second and Third Regiment had con­
tinued another half mile down the river, they would have 
been annihilated in the cul-de-sac cleverly prepared by the
18Finerty, op. cit., p. 155.
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1 9Sioux. ' The site of the•Indian village* Crook*s objective 
during the Battle of the Rosebud, was discovered on 
August 8* in proximity to its reported location. Camp de­
bris indicated the village had extended four miles down the 
river valley and was surrounded by rock-guarded eminences. 
Scouts reported Indian trails in the vicinity were ten to 
twelve days old, and were made by a herd of 10,000 to 
20,000 ponie s . ^
Much of the country traversed during August 7 and 8,
was covered with smoke from grass fires that had been
21started by the Indians. formally, burning was considered 
to promote luxuriant spring growth during the following 
season. In this case, the soldiers were certain denudation 
of the prairies was intended to deprive their mounts of 
pasturage.
The column proceeded northward along the Rosebud, to 
intercept an Indian trail, reported by the scouts to be of 
recent origin. On August 10, within thirty miles of the 
Yellowstone River, a huge cloud of dust was observed rising 
from the concealed Rosebud valley, north of their position. 
Scouts and commanders, on riding forward to determine if 
Indians or buffalo were to be encountered, finally saw
■*^ Flnerby, op. cit•, p . 157.
20- »Brown, op. cit., p. 283.
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large groups of horsemen in the distance. In response to
sighting advanced elements of Crook’s troops, the strange
horsemen fanned out to form skirmishers, in the practiced
manner of cavalrymen. The forces, of Crook and Terry had
converged while searching for the large body of Sioux, each
22force thinking the other was the object of the chase©
Details regarding the loss of Custer and his favor­
ite troops of the Seventh Cavalry--Companies C, E, F, I, 
and L— was available to the personnel of Crook’s command 
for the first time. Intimate accounts of the action were 
gleaned from surviving members of the battalions that had 
been under the command of Major Marcus A. Reno and Captain 
Frederick W. Benteen. Official reports of 1876 stated the 
estimated strength of the Sioux and their Cheyenne Allies 
to be approximately 2,500 warriors. Military witnesses, 
called to testify before the Reno Court of Inquiry, convened 
in Chicago on January 15, 1879, presented statements re­
garding the Indians’ strength on the fateful day of June 25, 
1876. These estimates range from 5,000 to 5,000 warriors.
The village, In moving, west about four o ’clock in the after­
noon of June 26, formed a compact body of warriors, families, 
ponies, and horse-drawn travois. That savage formation had
'King, op. cit. , pp. 71-72.
25U.S., Congress, House, Reoort of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2, 
p. 478.
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been estimated to be a half mile to a mile wide and two
24and a half to three miles long.
Gibbons Montana Column, after advancing to unite
with Custer’s Seventh Cavalry on June 26, found only the
dead bodies of Custer and his five companies scattered
along the east bank of the Little Big Horn on June 27.
After burying the dead^, Gibbon* s force with the survivors
of the Regiment retired to the mouth of the Big Horn, where
he remained until July 27. On that date, he moved down the
Yellowstone to a new depot at the mouth of the Rosebud,
25preparatory to uniting with Crook.
Terry had been reinforced by six companies of the 
Twenty-second Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant 
Colonel E. S. Otis, that reached him on August 1. Colonel 
N. A. Miles arrived the next day with six companies of the 
Fifth Infantry Regiment. The infantry had been reorganized 
into four battalions under the command of Colonel Gibbon.
The eight remaining companies of the Seventh Cavalry were 
commanded by Major Reno, senior surviving officer of that 
organization. Four companies of the Second Cavalry Regiment 
were commanded by Major J. S. Brisbin. Terry’s combined
O A
»7. A. Graham, Abstract of the Official Record of 
Proceedings of the Reno Court of Inquiry (Harrisburg: The
Stackpole Co., 1954), pp. 76, 99, 109, 165.
U.S., .Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2, 
pp. 475-74.
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force contained two, ten-pound rifles and one, twelve-
pounder under Lieutenant W. K. Low of the Twentieth.
26Infantry Regiment.
The depot on the Rosebud had been fortified with
entrenchments as a precaution against attack after departure
of the command* Defense of that point was entrusted to
Captain L. H* Sanger, _who was supported by one company of
the Seventeenth Infantry, the dismounted men of the Seventh
27
Cavalry, and three Gatling guns.
To increase the mobility of his force, Terry re­
turned his wagons to the depot and loaded the required
28supplies on pack mules. The pack trains of the Montana
and Dakota Columns were in shabby contrast to the practiced
and efficient operations of the Platte Column. Bourke, an
experienced critic of mule trains observed:
On the first dayTs march, after meeting Crook, 
Terry’s pack-train dropped, lost, or damaged, more 
stores than Crook’s command had spoiled from the same 
causes from the time when the campaign commenced.
Gibbon was quick to discern the importance of
properly conducted pack trains and decried the amateur
efforts of his personnel in his official reports of
October 17, 1876.
26Ibld., pp. 465-56.
27
Ibid., p. 466.
28Ibid.
29Bourke, op. cit., p. 355.
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Incumbered with heavily-loaded wagon-trains, our 
movements were necessarily slow, and when we did cut 
loose from these our only means of transporting sup­
plies were the mules taken from the teams, and un­
broken to packs, unsuitable pack-saddles, and inex­
perienced soldiers as packers. These latter soon 
learned to do their part tolerably well, but at the 
expense of the poor animals, whose festering sores 
after a few days1 marching appealed not only to 
feelings of humanity, but demonstrated the false 
economy of the course pursued.
. . . The contrast between the mobility of our
force and that of General Crook1s was very marked, 
especially for rapid movements. General Crook1s well- 
organized pack-train, with trained mules and its corps 
of competent packers, moved almost independently of 
the column of troops, and as fast as they could move. 
His ranks were not depleted by drafts to take charge 
of the packs and animals, for each mule faithfully 
followed the sound of the leader’s bell and needed no 
other guide, and his pack-mules were neither worn ouj^ n 
nor torn to pieces by bad saddles and worse packing.*'
After Terry had stripped his command for action,
the combined forces of about 4,000 men began a march eastward
following the Indians’ trail, on August 11, and camped for
31the evening on the Tongue River. That night a heavy down­
pour pelted the shelterless command and the rain continued 
until the afternoon of the next day. The march turned 
northward at the Tongue River and through August 12 and 13, 
horses began dropping along the way. Within forty miles of 
the Yellowstone River, the direction of march was changed 
eastward to the Powder River.
Marching through the mud exhausted some of the newly-
50U •S ., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Roc. 1, Part 2, 
p. 475.
31
Finerty, on. cit., p. 165.
recruited infantrymen of Terry1s command; by August 15,
additional recruits were suffering from swollen and bloody
feet. These young men were placed on travois, extra mules,
or, in several cases, the Shoshones loaded them on their 
52
ponies. The expedition reached the Yellov^stone on
August 17, and camped at the mouth of the Powder P.iver.
Slow movement .of the expedition became a source of
discontent to the Ute and Shoshone scouts. The friendly.
Indians would not serve with Terryfs column because of its
disreputable pack train. They said it impeded progress and
the enemy would never be caught. The Utes and Shoshones
returned to their homes on August 20. Reports received at
that time informed the Commanders that the Crows would not
send warriors so far from their own country with hostile
35Sioux on the warpath. Crook’s only remaining acouts were 
the half-breeds, the white frontiersmen, and a small party 
of Ree warriors.
Steamboats, that had supported Terry since the 
beginning of the expedition, resupplied the forces at the 
Powder River from the depot on the Rosebud. After drawing 
fifteen days1 rations, Crook’s force moved southward up the 
Powder on August 24. Terry followed the next day, but 
returned to the Yellowstone after receiving reports of
^Ibid., p. 167.
^Bourke, or), cit. . p. 355-57.
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hostile Indians along the river. Before departing, Terry 
assured Crook that additional supplies would he transported 
to the mouth of Glendive Creek, eastward on the Yellowstone
•rj • • 34River.
Crook had resolved to follow the Sioux trail until 
he attained his objectives: defeat and capture the hostiles, 
or run them onto the reservations. The line of General 
Crook1 s inarch departed the Powder River on August 25, and 
assumed pursuit of the Sioux along the trail originally 
followed with Terry. The days and nights of August 25 
through September 4, were punctuated with occasional rain, 
and one night of extreme cold. Mud continued to be the 
main enemy, but malnutrition, exposure, and overwork re­
sulted in neuralgia, rheumatism, malaria, and diarrhea
35
among .the debilitated personnel.
The Little Missouri River, a sullen, turbid stream 
flowing northward from the Blackhills, was crossed on 
September 4. Continuing eastv/ard, a tributary of the Heart 
River was intercepted on September 5, at a point 160 miles 
west of Fort Abraham Lincoln and 200 miles north of the 
Black Hills. The column had a small encounter with a body
34U.S., Gongress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
V/ar, 44 th Cong., 2d Ses-s., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2, 
pp. 466-67.
35
Bourke, op. cit., p. 363.
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3 6of hostiles, thought to he the enemy’s rear guard.
With only two and a half days’ rations remaining 
General Crook was forced to choose hetween three alterna­
tives: first, undergo a four or five day march eastward to 
Fort Abraham Lincoln, where his exhausted troops v/ould find 
ease and comfort; second, countermarch over his previous 
trail and direct his column to the supply depot Terry had 
established for him on the Yellowstone--at the mouth of 
Glendive Creek; or third, proceed directly southward to the 
Black Hills, that were seven days’ march from the Heart 
River. Since the scouts reported a fresh trail leading 
toward the unprotected mining communities, Crock considered 
himself duty-bound to pursue the elusive Sioux and prevent
their depredating against the illegal residents of the 
37Hills. At this time, he was convinced the summer con­
federation of the Sioux had dispersed; some hands had gone
to Canada, others to the Black Hills, and the less defiant
38had returned to the reservations.
In dispatches rushed to Fort Abraham Lincoln, Crook 
reported his plans to Sheridan in Chicago and requested 
supplies meet the column, in the northern edge of the Black 
Hills. Discussing his plan with Finerty, General Crook
56...Ibid., p. 365.
* ^7 Ibid.
38Knight, op. cit., p. 268.
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anticipated shortages in rations, saying,
"X have sent a telegram for supplies to General 
Sheridan* The wagons will meet us at Crook City or 
Deadwood* If not, the settlements must supply our 
wants* Nobody knows much about this region, but it 
looks fair. We *11 kill some game, too, perhaps, to 
make up for short rations. Half rations will be 
issued after to-night. All will be glad of the 
movement after the march has been r^ade. If necessary,” 
he added, "we can eat our horses.1'0
The march to the Black Hills began on September 5, 
over country barren of firewood and palatable water. The 
column was pelted continually by cold rain. Horses were 
abandoned by the score and some abruptly collapsed on the 
trail,* as if shot. On September 7, the Commander directed 
Captain Anson Mills to lead 150 men from the Third Cavalry 
Regiment to Deadwood to procure supplies for the starving 
column. Accompanying Captain Mills* party, were fifty pack 
mules and packers under Tom Moore. Other officers as­
sisting Mills were First Lieutenants Emmet Crav.eford,
40
A. H. Von Leuttewitz, and Frederick Schwatka. Horse meat
became a common source of sustenance.on September 8, as the
41
overstretched rations were, exhausted.
As the column was breaking camp on September 9, a 
messenger from-Captain Mills informed General Crook that
Finerty, op. cit.» p. 185.
^^Ibid., pp. 184-85.
41
Ibid., p. 185.
the detachment had attacked and captured a Sioux village of
forty-one lodges at Slim Buttes. Mills advised the General
that the Sioux were attempting to regain their village and
each of his horsemen had been equipped with only fifty
rounds of ammunition. The fight was seventeen miles south
of the column, and Crook immediately dispatched 100 men to
42
reinforce Mills.
Captain Mills had attacked the village at dawn,
stampeding the pony herd between the teepees. Only a few
Sioux prisoners were taken, the majority having reached a
bluff from where they fired effectively on the troops, in
the early morning light. Additional troops, accompanied by
the Commander, reached the village at eleven-thirty o !clock
and the balance of the column arrived in the late after-
43noon, after the fight was finished,*
From captives, the soldiers learned the chief of the 
village was American Horse, who had been fatally wounded.
The teepees yielded a large amount of military property 
identified as previously belonging to the Seventh Cavalry
A A
Regiment." Ureat quantities of dried food, including meat, 
was immediately appropriated by the soldiers, who were
90
anxious to feast on something more appetizing than horse 
flesh,
Indian captives laughed when they saw the soldiers 
devouring the dried meat, 7;hen he asked them why they 
laughed, Grouard was in turn asked v/h&t kind of meat 
they thought they were eating. Grouard said they 
supposed it was 'buffalo and venison, No, an Indian 
replied, the pony soldiers had kept them too much on 
the run that summer for them to hunt. Well, then, 
asked Grouard, what kind of meat was it? That, said 
a delighted savage, was the ponies that died.
Crazy Horse, encamped in the near vicinity, answered
the summons of his kinsmen and resumed the attack about
five o ’clock in the afternoon. Instead of finding only
Mills’ detachment of 150 troopers, the great Sioux war
chief was opposed by the complete Platte Column. The long
range fire of the infantry forced the Sioux to retire.
Crook lost three dead and about twenty-seven wounded.
Among the wounded was the valiant Von Leuttevvitz, whose leg
had been severely shattered at the outset, and had later
idbeen ampu ta t e d •
The column camped at American Horse’s village on the 
evening ox" September 9. Some of the soldiers obtained their 
first decent rest in six weeks, by draping their couches 
with, buffalo robes. Before putting his force on the trail 
the next morning, Crook released the Indian, prisoners. He
45
Knight, op. ext., pp. 274-75.
46 ’U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876,’House Bx. l5ocTTr7~Part~27 
p. 509,
told them the Government.had no desire to kill the Indians,
but they must accept unconditional surrender or be con-
47tinually harassed* These words were undoubtedly carried 
to the tribes and Crook*s kindness to the women and children 
must have scored strongly with the primitives, in their 
subsequent councils* As the troops filed southward from 
the camp on September 10, Crazy Horse attacked the rear 
guard axid wounded several soldiers, but lost five of his 
braves*
The marches of September 10, 11, and. 12, were miser­
able experiences; the rain and mud continued to be the bane 
of their existence and by September 12, some of the
personnel had returned to the diet of fresh horse meat*
48Also, on that date, seventy of the horses collapsed*
While breakfasting on horse steak the morning of Sep­
tember 13, wagons with supplies, accompanied by a herd of 
fifty cattle, arrived in camp from. Crook City* With the 
arrival of the food train, the members of the expedition 
could feel they were again in touch with civilization* 
General Crook relegated command of the column to
AQ
Colonel Merritt on September 15®' In pursuance to 
Sheridan*s order to report to Fort Laramie, Crook and his
a 7
Bourke, op* cit*, p. 37b.
48
Pinerty, op* cit., p* 202.
49Itold., p„ 206.
staff departed Deadwood on September 19. After resting at
Fort Robinson until September 22, the party continued to
50Laramie, arriving there on September 27.
The march of the Platte Column from August 5, when
the force departed its wagon train, until September 13,
when supplies arrived from Crook City, has been treated by
some Vvriters as General Crook1 s invention to promote human
misery. Truly, the hardships and privations experienced by
those men have been seldom exceeded in the military history
of the United States. ”It rained for twenty-two days, most
51of the storms being of phenomenal .severity.” The men. v/ere 
thoroughly wet much of the time, and had no extra clothing* 
When, they arrived in the small mining communities of the 
Black Hills, they bore no resemblance to military person­
nel. Between 500 and 600 horses Y^ere abandoned or killed 
because of exhaustion* 6 Horse meat had comprised the 
source of food for more than a week prior to the arrival of 
the Crook City ration train.
The most obvious reason for General Crook’s march was 
that his superiors directed him to harass, pursue, and 
drive the hostiles into the reservations. There is no 
indication that Crook did not understand the reasons for
Ibid., pp. 216-19.
v“Bourke, op, cit., p. 380.
52Finerty, op. cit., p. 205.
this policy, or that he was not in full ■ sympathy, with the
measures required to effect its enforcement. The march
resulted from his firm resolution to fulfill the policy
directed by his Government. He realized his force might be
strained to the limits of endurance and he never assured
his associates they would engage the Indians in a decisive
battle, after departing from Terry. His justification for
the march was that a resolute show of force would hasten
53the collapse of Sioux resistance.
53U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
\Sar, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc* 1, Part 2,~ 
p . o06«
CHAPTER V
FINAL AFFAIRS OF 1876
After General Crook’s arrival at Fort Laramie on
September 27, he discussed with General Sheridan three
problems of immediate importance: first, the establishment
of two military posts in the unceded Sioux hunting grounds,
south of the Yellowstone;^ second, continuation of the
punitive measures against the non-reservation Indians;
and third, the dismounting and disarming of the Indians on
2the Sioux reservations.
The Commander of the Division of the Missouri had 
urged, in his report of 1874, the establishment of two 
forts in the midst of the area favored by the -renegade 
Sioux; that is, the area south of the Yellowstone and be­
tween the Powder River and the eastern slope of the Big 
Horn Mountains. In his report of 1876, he cited the 
failure to build these forts as a reason for the diffi-
'Z.
culties encountered during the summer with the Sioux.
^Records at the War Department Record Group 94, 
Document File 4164 (Sioux War) 1876, Item: 5184 AGO 1876.
^Knight, op. cit., p. 280.
5
U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2, 
p. 442.
impressed by Sheridan*s reasoning and the exigencies of the 
situation, the Secretary of War had encouraged Congressional 
appropriation of $200,000 for -construction of the instal­
lations* Congress, motivated by the terrible disaster that-
had befallen Custer, passed a bill appropriating the ro-
4
quested funds, on July 22, 1876* In his telegram of tne
same date, Sherman notified his Lieutenant General of the
Congressional action and urged Sheridan proceed vfith his-
patch in establishing the new posts*v
Sheridan*s recommendation of 1874 had envisioned
additional forts on the Yellowstone, at the mouths of the
Tongue and Big Horn Rivers, In his letter of August 10,
1876, .Sheridan advised the General of the Army that he
would be unable to build the fort on the Big Horn because
of the lateness of the season and the consequent fall of
the Yellowstone River* He suggested the second fort would
be located in the vicinity of old Fort Phil Kearny, at the
6
southern end of the unceded hunting grounds.
As of August 10, 1876, Sheridan doubted Crook and 
Terry would engage the hostile Indians in a decisive stand. 
He voiced the opinion that the only solution was through
flbid., p. 37.
^Records of the War Department, Record Group 94, 
Document File 4163 (Sioux War) 1876, Item: 4212 AGO 1876.
6Records of the Y/ar Department, Record Group 94, 
Document File 4163 (Sioux War-) 1876, Item: 4718 AGO 1876.
control of the game country and firm policing of the Sioux 
agencies. Further justification for the forts was con­
tained in his views- on the Indians* modus operand!:
I have never looked on any.decisive battle with these. 
Indians as a settlement of the trouble, and in fact I 
have never expected any decisive battle at all® Indians 
do not fight such battles; they only fight boldly when 
they have the advantage, as in the Custer case, or to 
cover the movement of their women and children, as in 
the case of Crook on June 17, Battle of the Rosebud 
but Indians have scarcely ever been severely punished 
unless by adapting their ovm mode of warfare, or 
tactics, and stealing on them®
General Sherman in his letter of August 25, 1876, to
Sheridan continued to hope for a decisive engagement® The
propriety of Sheridan* s plans v/ere obvious, in the event it
8became necessary to defeat the Indians in detail®
Replying to Sherman*s letter on August 30, 1876, Sheridan 
assured his superior the troops would pursue the hostiles 
until they were subdued. In discussing the site of the 
forts, he advised Sherman the installation at the mouth of 
the Tongue River would be established as originally planned. 
The southern fort would be located on the site of old Fort 
Reno, where some of the buildings could be reconditioned 
for use as barracks and storehouses. Strategically, this 
fort provided a point for surveillance of the upper Powder 
River and the Indian trail from the agencies to Powder
7fIbid.
8,
Re cor as of the Y*ar Department Record Group 94, 
Document File 4164 (Sioux War) 1876, Item: 4990 AGO 1876.
River® It was near enough to Fort Fetterman to be supplied
at the late period of the season when General Crook could
9
furnish personnel and transportation.
The new forts were to be of prime importance in sup­
porting the winter campaign of 1876-77 against the non­
reservation Sioux. Colonel Kelson A. Miles, the energetic 
Commander of the Fifth Infantry, would march from the 
Tongue River Cantonment to deliver damaging blows to the 
bands of Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. George Crook, the 
taciturn veteran of numerous Indian wars, would conduct his 
final campaign of 1876 from Cantonment Reno.
For the third time, in 1876, General Crook became 
engrossed in the collection of forces for a thrust against 
the hostile s. This column, officially designated as the 
Powder River Expedition, was to be assembled from military 
units that had not been exhausted in previous expeditions. 
The Fourth Cavalry Regiment, from Kansas, was among the new 
units assigned to the latest enterprise. Colonel Ranald S. 
Mackenzie, Regimental Commander, was a contemporary of 
Merritt and Custer, and had been one of the victors of the 
campaigns against the Southern Plains Indians, during 1874 
and 1875.
9
Records of the War Department Record Group 94, 
Document File 4164 (Sioux War) 1876, Item.: 5184 AGO 1876.
"^William H. Leckie, The Military Conquest of the 
Southern Plains (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1963), pp. 234-35.
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While planning the nev; movement, Crook was diverted
Sheridan to the Red Clond Agency on October 14, and
began disarming and immobilizing the Indians* When the
General arrived, he received reports that the Agency
11Indians were In communication with the hostiles. The
Oglala bands of Red Cloud and Red Leaf had moved their 
camps to Chadron Creek, twenty-two miles from the agency.
The 'military wanted all the bands close to the agency to 
prevent the incoming stragglers from being confused with 
the peaceful Indians, The Red Cloud and Red Leaf bands were 
suspected of selling arms and ammunition to their hostile 
brethren.® They incited further distrust of the Army by
*i p
refusing orders to move to the agency#
Colonel Wesley Merritt had been ordered south from
") Kr
the Black HI13..S to surround the reservation Indians. J',j 
Crook had obtained information that some of the Indians at 
the outlying villages were preparing to flee to the war 
camps. He confounded their scheme by going into action 
before Merritths arrival. Colonel Mackenzie, with eight 
companies of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment and some Pawnee 
Scouts departed Fort Robinson, near Red Cloud Agency, after
" "'Records of the War Department, Record Group 94, 
Document File 4163 (Sioux War) 1976, Item: 6429 AGO 1876,
10Bourke, op. cit., p. 337.
^Klng, op, cit, , p# 140.
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dark on the evening of October 22.14 Finding themselves
surrounded the next morning, the truant bands peacefully
surrendered, were immediately d-isarmed and deprived of their
ponies, and returned to the Agency. About 700 horses and
15fifty rifles were seized.
General Crook assembled the chiefs of the Oglalas, 
Brules, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes to inform them the Govern­
ment expected their loyalty in return for the rations and 
support they accepted from the Agencies. He notified the 
chiefs that they were to be held responsible for the conduct
of their young men and since he had been charged with main-
16tainlng peace, they would regret future depredations. Red
Cloud was informed he was no longer a chief and the friendly
17Spotted Tail was appointed head chief. In his letter of 
October 50, to General Sheridan, he justified his action In 
not disarming the bands that had demonstrated good faith:
The other bands, not disarmed, known as the Arapa- 
hoes, Loafers, and Cut-off Sioux have been loyal to us, 
and, to have disarmed them v/ith the others would simply 
have arrayed the white man against the Indian and placed 
the loyal and disloyal on the same footing. By not 
doing this they were convinced in the most decided 
manner, that such was not our intention, and no amount 
of talk about "our friendship,ff and ffthe friendship of
1 4-Records of the War Department, Record Group 94, 
Document File 4153 (Sioux War) 1876, Item* 6429 AGO 1876.
1 5Brown, op. cit., p. 294.
16
Bourke, op. c 11., pp.. 387-88.
17Brown, op. cit.
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the Great' Father,15 would have so thoroughly impressed 
it upon their minds®
For the first- time in the history of this reser­
vation did they see the loyal treated as well even as 
those v/ho have been persistently stubborn and disloyal® 
This good effect was at once manifested in the desire 
of warriors from these bands to ” " " 'ments
Army and the Secretary of War® Sheridan*s endorsement of 
November 6, to his subordinate1s communication, illustrated 
a divergent point of view, in the technique of handling 
surrendered Indians:
The action of Gen® Crook in disarming the Redcloud 
and Redleaf bands of Indians at the Redcloud Agency is 
highly approved. His neglect to disarm and dismount 
other bands at that Agency is disapproved, and all the 
theories in his report seem to be given as a plea for 
not having performed what he promised and what was 
expected of him, ang which would have been good policy 
and true humanity. ^
friendly Indians were not immediately disarmed and im-
his PoY,:der River Fxpeditlon® Major Mason, possibly fearing
Document File 4163 (Sioux War) 1876, Item: 6429 AGO 1876.
have since been going on there
Crook* s letter v:as forwarded to the General of the
Regardless of General Sheridan*s opinions, the
mobilised. In his letter of November 16, 1876, Major J. W. 
Mason, Commander of Fort Robinson, Informed General Sheridan
that the friendly bands were still armed. General Crook had
successfully recruited scouts from among these Indians for
teco r d Gr ou p 94
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General Sheridan, ’’The families of Indians who are with 
Genera?!. Crook are protected and cared for, so that no
20dissatisfaction may result from ill treatment of them.”
The summer campaign was officially terminated and the 
troops returned to their permanent posts shortly after dis­
mounting and disarming had been completed, General Crook*s 
official farewell message to members of the Big Born and 
Yellowstone Expedition was issued at Fort Robinson as his 
General Order Number 8, dated October 24, 1876. This docu­
ment acknowledged the hardships- encountered by the force and 
commended all personnel on the performance of their duty.
General Crook returned to his task of organizing the 
Powder River Expedition. The combat force for the General’s 
second winter expedition consisted of units that had not 
previously participated in the campaigns.of 1876--except for 
Company K of the Second Cavalry Regiment, This unit, under 
Captain James Egan, had been engaged in the Big Horn and 
Yellowstone Expedition. Other cavalry organizations were: 
Companies H and K of the Third Cavalry Regiment; Companies 
B, D, E, F, I, and M of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment; and 
Companies H and L of the Fifth Cavalry Regiment. All 
cavalry units were placed under the command of Colonel
20Records of the War Department, Record Group 94, 
Document File 4165 (Sioux War; 1876, Item: 678B AGO 1876.
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Ranald S. Mackenzie of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment,
Colonel Richard I, Dodge, of the Twenty-third
Infantry Regiment, commanded a large force of riflemen^*
The organizations under Colonel DodgeTs leadership were:
Batteries C, F, H, and K, Fourth Artillery Regiment, that
had been designated to serve as infantry; Companies A, B,
C, F, I, and K of the Ninth Infantry Regiment; Companies D
and G of the Fourteenth Infantry Regiment; and Companies C,
G, and I of the Twenty-third Infantry Regiment,
A mule train of 400 animals was to provide mobility
to the quartermaster*s section. The able leaders, Tom Moore
and Dave Means, supervised the pack train and the sixty-five
packers, A column of 168 wagons accompanied the expe- 
24dition. The wagon train employed during the Big Horn and
the Yellowstone Expedition had been retu.rned to Fort Laramie
for overhaul and refitting. It was then directed to proceed
25to Fort Fetterman to support the Powder River Expedition,
Major Frank North and his brother, Luther North, re­
cruited a company of 100 Pawnee scouts for the expedition. 
General Crook enlisted 150 Sioux, Arapahoes, and Cheyenne to 
also serve as scouts. These Indians were mounted on ponies
22
Bourke, op. cit,, p. 389.
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previously confiscated at Red Cloud Agency* After the 
expedition had been on the trail three days, the column was 
joined by 100 Shoshone and Bannock braves, led by Tom Cos­
grove. Frank Grouard was also to accompany the force.
?*'h©n the Powder River Expedition v/ao assembled at 
Fort Fette.rman, it was composed of sixty-one officers, 1,456 
enlisted men, and 350 Indians. The total number-of fighting 
men was 1,847. If the sixty-five packers and their super­
visors, together with over 160 wagon teamsters were included 
the total manpower of the expedition would have exceeded
0*7
2,000. It is well to remember that mule packers and wagon 
drivers were exceedingly capable Indian fighters.
The column departed Fort Fetterman on November 15, 
and proceeded northward along the Bozeman Trail, arriving at 
Cantonment Reno--old Fort Reno--four days later. Cantonment 
Reno was one of the two forts established at the behest of 
General Sheridan. Some of the old structures had been re­
habilitated under the energetic administration of Major 
Pollock. Although restoration was incomplete, Cantonment 
Reno possessed supplies and shelter from strong Indian war
no
parties and the rigors of the Northern Plains winter.
General Crook directed the Arapahoes and Sioux to
^Brown, op. cit. , pp. 294-96.
^ I b i d . , p. 294.
28Bourke, op. cit., p. 391.
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perform a reconnaissance of the eastern slope to the Big
Horn Mountains. The scouts departed Cantonment Reno on
November 18, and returned three days later. Location of
many of the villages had been determined from a young
Cheyenne renegade,, who had been captured by the scouts.
The youth reported Crazy Horse1s village was near the
29
battlefield on the Rosebud River.
The column inarched northward along the Bozeman Trail 
intent on mounting an attack on Crazy Horse. At Crazy 
Woman Creek, about twenty miles north of Cantonment Reno, 
Crook learned from one of his scouts, Sitting Bear, that 
Crazy Horse had been warned of the presence of the expe­
dition. The General, certain that his old adversary could 
not be trapped, if forewarned, diverted his attention to a
Cheyenne- village at the south end of the Big Horn
-i t j_ • oOmountains•
■ •Following the advice of his scouts, Crook directed 
the column to move southwest toward the renegade Cheyenne 
camp. Mackenzie, with the vanguard of cavalry, made a 
rigorous night march on November 24 and 25. At dawn, his 
force of cavalry and Indian allies burst upon the sleeping 
village that was located in a small valley of the Red Fork
^%rown, op. cit. , p. 295.
30Records of the War Department, Record Group 94, 
Document File 4163 (Sioux War) 1876, Item: 565 AGO 1877.
of Powder River* The camp was instantly awakened and the
Cheyenne warriors organized a rear guard action, while
squaws and children hurried for the cover of rocks and
31ravines at the west end of the village*
After the first charge of the cavalry and the Indian 
Allies, the Cheyenne warriors retreated to the natural de­
fensive positions where their families had hidden. The 
victors "began destroying the village in the afternoon and in 
ramsacking the teepees, many articles were found that had 
previously belonged to members of CusterTs annihilated bat­
talion* Among the more grisly trophies were found a buckskin
bag containing the right hands of twelve Shoshone babies and
32a necklace with eight Indian fingers attached as pendants.
Throughout November 25, the beleaguered Cheyennes
conducted a long-range sniping duel with their enemies*.
Scouts, in guarded conversation with the hostiles, learned
the village was under the leadership of Dull Knife. The
Chief bitterly assailed the Sioux and Cheyenne scouts,
calling out, "Go home--you have no business here; we can
»33whip the white soldiers alone, but can't fight you too."
This statement justified General Crook's policy of using
Indians to fight Indians.
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Unable to dislodge, the fortified Cheyennes, Mac­
kenzie requested the infantry to support him with their long 
rifles. General Crook arrived with the foot troops, com­
manded by Colonel Dodge, after the hostiles had withdrawn .
34
under the cover of darkness. The Cheyennes retreated
several miles from their first defensive site and endured a
grim night, unsheltered from the November cold. Eleven
babies expired in their mothers1 arms; horses were killed
and their bellies cut open so the half-naked old men and
55
women could warm their feet in the entrails.’'
Colonel Mackenzie reported 173 lodges destroyed, 500 
ponies captured, and twenty-five Indians confirmed as killed, 
Among the Indian dead were three sons of Dull. Knife.
Crook1s force lost one officer and five enlisted men killed 
and twenty-five wounded. ^ The expedition returned to 
Cantonment Reno and the Shoshones, upset by the pitiful 
trox^hies discovered in the Cheyenne camp, hurried back to 
their villages. General Crook led the column eastward to 
the headwaters of the Belle Fourche in a search for ad­
ditional renegade encampments. Continuing their reconnais­
sance, the troops moved down the Belle Fourche. to the base
° *lbid.
55lbid.
v'0Records of the War Department, Record Group. 94, 
Document File 4163 (Sioux War) 1876, Item: 565 AGO 1877.
106
of the Black Hills, enduring the discomfort of extreme cold.
Messengers were dispatched to Red Cloud Agency to obtain
information from the friendly Indians rega3?ding the location
of Crazy Horse's camp. Since the horses were losing their
stamina, Crook also requested additional scouts with fresh
mounts. His returning Indians brought information that
Crazy Horse and his band had fled to the Bad Lands of the
Little Missouri River, far beyond the range and endurance
57of his weakening horses.
Dispatches from General Sheridan, on December 20, 
cautioned Crook that expenditures for transportation had 
exceeded his monthly allowance of §65,000 by an additional 
§28,000* Having exhausted the supplemental grain and 
feed from the pack train, the animals were forced to exist 
on grass of inferior quality, which was mostly snow--covered. 
Since there was little hope of establishing contact with the 
enemy, General Crook resolved to terminate the campaign*
The column returned to Cantonment Reno, gathered, its rear 
echelon, and arrived at Fort Fetterman on December 29*
The hostile Cheyennes, after withdrawing from the 
vicinity of the plundered camp, started a painful march 
across the frozen landscape to the encampment of Crazy 
Horse* Crow scouts, traveling south to Cantonment Reno, had
7.0
Brown, op* cit,, p. 300*
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endured a frightful blizzard and near-starvation* This 
party had crossed the Cheyenne trail and had followed it 
toward Rosebud Creek* A Cheyenne campsite they examined 
had consisted of hundreds of fires and little couches of 
willows and grass-~but no teepees* There was a difference 
of opinion regarding the degree of hospitality displayed by 
the Sioux to their Cheyenne friends* One author states:
’’The Sioux treated them kindly and supplied most of their 
v/ants."^ John G. Bourke related:
’’Crazy Horse" was indifferent to the sufferings of 
his a3_Iies and turned the cold shoulder upon them com­
pletely, and this so aroused their indignation that 
they decided to follow the example of those who had envn 
rolled under our flag and sent in word to that effect* “
It was difficult to believe the Cheyennes would sur­
render and seemingly absurd to accept the proposition that 
they -would enlist against Crazy Horse* The personnel at Red 
Cloud were astounded when, in the last days of December, 
1876, and the first of January, 1877, groups of destitute 
Cheyennes arrived at the agency* Their progress was neces­
sarily slow because of the condition of their ponies and the 
wounded© Finally, the main band arrived and announced their
AT
intention, to fight their former friends* *
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' George Bird Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes 
(Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 195877.P® 382©
^Bourke, op* cit,,'p, 594#
41 Ibid *
The impact of the Powder River Expedition on the 
Northern Plains Indians is implied in Bourke’s statements© 
The Cheyennes had been the Siouxs’ most valuable ally. In 
warfare, they had rivalled the Sioux in bravery and had 
ridden in the vanguard with their friends, the Sioux, to do 
battle against the Great Father’s pony soldiers. News of 
the destruction of Dull Knife’s village, not only confirmed 
the mighty Cheyennes had been severely chastised, but that 
the Government’s forces would continue to conduct the 
deadly winter campaigns until the non-reservation Indians 
were subjugated© Their will to resist withered even further 
when the loyal Cheyennes flocked to the reservations and 
became scouts for the Army. The capitulation of Crazy Horse, 
the greatest warrior of the Plains Indians, was undoubtedly 
hurried, in the summer of 1877, by these considerations©
CONCLUSION
Similar to the conflicts o f 'mankind in other eras, 
the Sioux War of 1876 illustrated the diversity of aims 
fostered by the warring groups* Knowing the extreme di­
vergence of economic and cultural aspirations of the Indians 
and the Americans, the historical results could hardly be 
avoided* This divergence can be summarized by the Indian1s 
characterization of the white- man as a despoiler and liar; 
the white man’s antipathy to the Indian was represented by 
the inhumane statement, 11 The only good Indian Is a dead 
Indian, - It was on these bases that the irreconcilable 
impasse of' nineteenth century Western America was nurtured*
Final resolution was effected by the growing and 
overwhedraing strength of the white men and the decreasing 
strength c.f the Indians, With the passage of years, a 
juxtaposltloning of strength occurred involving manpower, 
economic foundation, and group morale. For the Tetons, the 
events of 1876 signaled the apex of this juxtapositioning 
and the formidable Lakota would never again be the scourge
1 1 2
of the Northern Plains*
Popular commentary has converted Custer’s annihi­
lation on the Little Big Horn info the most significant 
event during the campaigns of 1876* From this Lloody inci­
dent, the cursory reader may assume the Governments troops 
were led by inadequate officers* While Custer* s action was 
undeniably gross, the basic military aims of the Sioux War 
of 187G were doggedly pursued and the individual campaigns, 
as directed and conducted by the primary Army commanders, 
advanced the basic war objectives*
Prior to the Sioux War, it was conceived that if 
white and red men could not live peacefully on the same 
lands, they should, be separated* Hence, the Americans--the 
stronger party-concluded it was humane to isolate the 
Indians on reservations thereby preserving both American 
and Indian lives. The red men were to receive the benefits 
of training In the white men* s civilization and Christi­
anity, for which the Indian would not have traded one moth- 
eaten scalp* Corralling the Indians onto reservations, 
consequently, was the basic military.aim of 1876*
George Crook’s contribution to the campaigns of 
1876 was significant in achieving the Government’s desired 
goal* While the terminal fights with the Tetons were to 
occur in the first portion of 1877 against Crazy Horse, 
Sitting Bull and their adherents, Crook had effectively
blunted the keen edge of the militant Lakota, in his expe­
ditions of the previous year*
Success In implementing the Government’s punitive 
policy against the non-reservation Tetons was achieved 
through slow, grinding attrition rather than spectacular 
victories on tne battlefield* While the Indians avoided 
pitched battles, unless the odds were greatly in their 
favor, or unless their encampments were Immediately 
threatened, the United States Army was reduced to employing 
the tactic of harassment* Except for the Battle of the 
Rosebud, the primary activity of the Government’s forces in 
1876 was the pursuit of the nomads and destruction of en­
campments® Constant military pressure disrupted their 
hunting economy and physically weakened the warriors, as 
well as the women and children©
General Crook was properly conditioned, by tempera­
ment and Inclination, to live the life of an Indian fighter* 
Taciturn and phlegmatic, he bore the hardships of crude 
bivouacs and. the rigors of the trail, without impairment to 
his judgment* As a dedicated 'soldier, he strove with 
single-mindedness of purpose to execute the policy of his 
g o v e ran a n t, w i t h ou t questioning; the moral correctness of 
that policy* In the execution of his duties, he applied the 
tools found useful in previous Indian conflicts* Among 
these were the employment of Indians, as scouts for combat
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forces--preferably dissidents from the tribe being pursued; 
the transfer of essential war material from wagons to mule 
trains, attended by professional packers, when operating 
from advanced supply bases, or when it was necessary to 
strike rapidly or into rough, trackless terrain; the 
streamlining of his mounted troops by discarding nones­
sential equipment, thereby decreasing the load carried by 
his cavalry horses and increasing the speed and flexibility 
of his forces. Whatever the merits of Crook’s charges a- 
gainst Colonel Reynolds and others, the legal actions taken 
after the Big Horn Expedition, solidified discipline in his 
subsequent campaigns. The Horse Meat March, of September 
1876, could have resulted in subsequent widespread de­
sertion, denouncement, or even mutiny. Instead, his 
capture of American Horse’s village and the repulse of 
Crazy Horse’s counterattack at Slim Buttes prove he retained 
command and control of his force, although it was operating 
on the verge of starvation and despair.
Cold fear, unreasoning hatred, or secret guilt 
nurtured the theory of extermination as the nineteenth 
century solution to the Indian question. This Western my­
opia did not infect General Crook’s attitude when fighting 
or negotiating with his savage adversaries. He discrimi­
nated between Teton bands, which displayed a complaisant 
attitude after surrender, in 1876, and those that remained
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truculent after they returned to the* reservations. To 
demonstrate that friends were properly recognised* he tried 
to avoid disarming ana dismounting the friendly Tetons, 
thereby earning the displeasure of General Sheridan* How­
ever, scouts were enlisted for later campaigns from these 
bands.
The picture of George Crook which emerges from, a 
study of his military activities in 1876 portrays a durable, 
stable, and reliable leader® He exuded no glamour and even 
in the immediate aftermath of his greatest forays against 
the Tetons, he appeared unspectacular* After interpreting 
the vignettes of history, it must be concluded that General 
Crook performed excellently in discharging his duties during 
the Sioux War of 1876e
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